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This paper forms the third part of a series on the development and 
study of first-order modal theories. It was not originally intended for 
this issue, but is relevant to Prior's work in two main ways. First, it 
does not treat modal logic as a mere technical exercise, but attempts 
to relate it to common philosophical concerns. This was an approach 
that Prior himself adopted and perhaps did more than anyone else to 
foster. Secondly, the paper deals with the more specific topic of facts. 
This was a matter upon which Prior had definite views and upon 
which he had written extensively - in relation to the definition of 
necessity ([25]), the semantics for the modal system Q ([26]), and the 
correspondence theory of truth ([27] and [29]). I have found all of 
these writings useful and, although I have disagreed with him on 
several points, the influence of his views on my own should be 
evident. 
It is therefore with respect and affection that I dedicate this paper 
to his memory. 
The paper falls into two main parts, one philosophical and the other 
technical. Either may be read independently of the other, but both are 
required for an all-round view. The first part is in two sections. One 
attempts to show that a modal first-order theory of facts is viable, and 
the other discusses its principles and their bearing on various 
philosophical issues. The second part is in six sections, which fall into 
three groups. Those of the first group (§§3--4) deal with the modal 
theory of possible worlds, both in itself and in its application to other 
subject-matter. Since I regard worlds as very big facts, it is only 
natural that they should be considered in this paper. The next section 
(§5) deals with the theory of facts under the anti-objectualist assump- 
tion that they contain no individual constituents. The sections of the 
last group (§§6-8) deal with facts under objectualist assumptions and 
include a statement of the appropriate objectualist conditions, a proof 
of their equivalence to the corresponding conditions for propositions, 
and an account of the resulting theories. It will be helpful, and 
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sometimes essential, to have the earlier parts of the series ([15] and 
[16]) at hand. 
In the technical part of this paper, I have concentrated on the 
question of finding a correct  essentialist theory of facts. As far as I 
know, very  little work has been done in this direction, although there 
is a start in [46]. On the other hand, there is now a fair amount  of 
material on facts as a subject,  not of object- theory,  but  of semantical 
meta theory (see [45], [21] and [43], for example). I do not wish to 
dispute the interest of this material, either for logic or the philosophy 
of language; but it will not fall within the purview of the paper. 
1. P R E L I M I N A R I E S  
Before the task of formalizing the theory of facts is begun, it will be 
helpful to stress some preliminary points concerning the means by 
which the various principles are to be formalized. The first point is 
that there is singular or nominal reference to facts;  the second is that 
facts are not  true propositions, but  a distinctive kind of entity; and 
the last is that the obtaining of a fact  is merely a form of existence. 
Let  us consider each point in turn. 
Nominal  reference  is reference by means of an expression in 
nominal position. It is either definite, with a name referring to a 
particular object ,  or indefinite, with a variable ranging over  a class of 
objects.  Now on the face of it, there is nominal reference to facts of 
both varieties in ordinary usage. When we say " the fact that the 
Watergate bugging took place is disgraceful" or "whatever  fact  he 
uncovers  is unlikely to help," we seem to be using " the fact  that the 
Watergate incident took place" as a name for a particular fact  and the 
phrase "whatever  fac t"  as part of the nominal quantificational ap- 
paratus for  referring to facts; and similarly for  a multitude of other 
expressions. 
Even  locutions that might appear to suggest an alternative view 
conform readily to the nominalist theory.  With the construction 'it is a 
fact  that p '  for  example,  it seems most natural to follow the trans- 
formational grammarians and to take it as a t ransform of ' that p is a 
fact ' ,  and then to suppose, not too recklessly one hopes, that the 
phrase ' that p '  does indeed refer  to a fact  when the whole statement 
is true. 
This doctrine of singular reference  stands in opposition to two 
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other views. One is that we have reference of sorts to facts but that it 
is carried by expressions in sentential position, either sentences 
themselves, in the case of definite reference, or what are effectively 
sentential variables, in the case of indefinite reference. The other 
view is that there is no reference of any sort to fact's, either nominal 
or sentential, definite or indefinite. 
Of these two opposing views, the latter is most implausible. Surely 
when we say that not all of the relevant facts have been considered or 
that the recently discovered fact will prove critical, there is reference 
of some sort to facts, a reference that will show up either in the use 
of nominal or sentential variables. 
The other view is more plausible and, ever since it was propounded 
by Russell [36], has found favor with a large number of philosophers. 1 
But it has never been made clear what, other than a philosophical 
prejudice against facts, stands in the way of taking the linguistic data 
at its face value, as evincing singular reference. The view is also 
subject to difficulties of its own. If the quantifiers for facts were 
sentential, one would expect the sentence 'whatever fact Holmes 
discovered, Watson will be surprised that it' to be grammatical, and 
not with just 'it obtains' in place of 'it'. One might adopt the ingenious 
pro-sentential theory of Belnap et al.[4] to overcome this particular 
difficulty. I am not sure this helps altogether; but there are other 
difficulties. We do not say 'some facts might be false', even though on 
the sentential theory it should be true, and we say such things as 'He 
considered the books on the subject but not the recently discovered 
facts ' ,  requiring a syntactic ambiguity of 'He considered ' as 
predicate and connective. Given that there is such a simple and 
natural alternative, it seems better to drop a view that is so unnatural 
and complicated and that has only a certain philosophical prejudice in 
its favour. 
This is not to say, though, that the sentential theory may not serve 
various philosophical purposes. I have no objection, as such, to 
denominalizing fact talk as a way of getting rid of an ontological 
commitment to facts. But I distinguish sharply between the task of 
discerning our ordinary commitments and the task of retrenching on 
those commitments (see §A2 of [14]). My criticisms are of the 
sentential theory as an account of what gets retrenched, not as a 
retrenchment. 
Although I shall emphasize this and subsequent linguistic points, it 
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should not be thought that the feasibility of my project of formalising 
the theory of facts depends completely on them. Let it be granted that 
my most adamant opponent is right and that there is no reference of 
any sort to facts in ordinary discourse. Then I would be in the same 
position as a philosopher whose native language lacked even any 
alleged reference to facts. So my theory could not possess the interest 
or rationale of dealing with entities with which we are already 
familiar. I would prefer my theory to have that interest, and this is 
why I have stressed the linguistic points. But the theory may have 
another interest altogether. For we may suppose that facts have been 
introduced by philosophers to satisfy certain theoretical demands. 
Perhaps it is thought that it is only by positing certain entities that the 
notion of truth can properly be explained, regardless of whether we 
ordinarily refer to such entities. We can then take our theory of facts 
to be about the entities that these philosophers have in mind. 
It is in the same spirit that the mathematician may introduce sets 
into his discourse. He is certainly not going to be bothered by the 
ordinary usage of the term 'set'; and perhaps no more should the 
philosopher, in his more theoretical moments, he bothered about the 
ordinary usage of the term 'fact'. 
In what follows, I shall assume that my linguistic points are correct, 
though the possibility of an alternative interpretation may always be 
borne in mind. Let it be granted, then, that ordinary language sanc- 
tions the interpretation of the individual variables of our first-order 
modal theory as ranging over facts. Now if the resulting theory is to 
be of independent interest, it is necessary that facts not be instances 
of entities that are already well understood. But it has been suggested 
(by Ducasse [9], Carnap [6] and others) that facts are merely true 
propositions. If this were so, the theory of facts could simply be 
absorbed into a theory of propositions, as developed in Fine [15] or 
elsewhere. 
There are, however, compelling arguments against the proposed 
identification. Some of them are summarized in Clark [8]. But even 
within the confines of a simple modal language, with existence as its 
sole predicate, it is possible to show that facts are not propositions. 
For consider, the proposition p that Carter was president in 1979 and 
the fact f that Carter was president in 1979. Then the proposition p 
exists even should Carter not be president, but the fact f does not. 
Therefore p and f are distinct. (This argument may be traced back to 
F I R S T - O R D E R  M O D A L  T H E O R I E S  47 
Moore [22], p. 308; it also appears in Sprigge [40], p. 83, and Slote [39], p. 
99.) 
Of the different arguments for the non-identity of facts and pro- 
positions, this one is especially noteworthy; for it relies on one of the 
most significant features of facts, viz. the conditions under which 
they exist. As we shall see, reference to this feature is essential to the 
formulation of the most fundamental principles concerning facts. 
Thus, it is not even as if, for the limited purposes of our theory, we 
could suppose that facts and propositions were the same. 
Our argument for non-identity has been put in terms of counter- 
factuals. It may perhaps be put more perspicuously in terms of 
possible worlds. Let the existence-set of an entity be the class of 
possible worlds in which it exists. Given a proposition p and a fact f, 
say that [ corresponds to p if, for some sentence 6, o is the 
proposition that 6 and f is the fact that 6 2 (cf~ Moore [22], pp. 256-7). 
Then the point of the argument is that the existence-sets of a 
proposition and its corresponding fact will not, in general, be the 
same. 
Thus the argument is one in which two entities are shown to be 
distinct in terms of the counterfactual conditions for their existence. 
What is of interest about such arguments is that they do not depend 
upon the features of the entities within any one world but upon what 
one might call their transworld features. Such arguments are of 
importance in establishing the distinctness of other allegedly identical 
entities (Kripke's argument [18] against the identity thesis is a case in 
point) and would often seem to constitute the only means of es- 
tablishing such claims. 
Of course, our particular argument does not establish that each fact 
is distinct from a proposition to which it corresponds or, indeed, that 
any fact is distinct from all propositions. But the plausibility of the 
proposed identification is of a peculiar sort. For it will only be 
plausible to hold that a fact is identical to a true proposition in case it 
is identical to the proposition to which it corresponds; and this will be 
plausible in one case, only if it is in all other cases. It therefore 
suffices, in showing that no fact is identical to a proposition, to 
provide a single instance of a fact which is not identical to the 
corresponding proposition. 
Indeed, the argument is of even greater generality than this further 
consideration might suggest; for I have merely argued against the 
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identity of actual facts to propositions. But a closely related 
argument applies against the identity of possible facts to propositions. 
Suppose, for reductio, that the possible fact f were identical to the 
proposition p. Now any possible fact is possibly an actual fact. Quite 
generally, we may say, it lies in the nature of a possible 4)-er that it 
should possibly be an actual +-er. So take a world w in which f is an 
actual fact. Then f is still identical to p in w, and since p is essentially 
a proposition, y is identical to a proposition in w. But presumably our 
earlier claim concerning the non-identity of actual facts holds neces- 
sarily; necessarily, whatever the actual facts, they are distinct 
from the propositions. Therefore the actual fact [ in w is not a 
proposition in w, contrary to our previous conclusion. 
A similar argument applies against other attempted conflations of 
the possible. 3 A possible man, for example, is not an abstract object; 
for a possible man can possibly be an actual man and hence be 
concrete, but no abstract can possibly be concrete. Another example, 
of significance to our later concerns, is that of possible worlds. A 
possible world is not any sort of abstract object, such as a proposition or 
set; for a possible world is possibly actual and is not then a proposition 
or the like. Possible worlds are merely a species of possible objects, 4 
with the peculiarity that the actual instances are world-bound and 
necessarily number one. 
There has been a philosophical tradition that has allowed a dis- 
tinctive role for actual facts but has taken possible facts to be 
propositions; and, more generally, there has been a philosophical 
tradition that has allowed a distinctive role for actual or concrete 
entities of a certain kind but has taken the corresponding possible 
entities to be abstract. But if I am right, both of these traditions rest 
upon a simple modal mistake. 
Just as my previous arguments did not tell against the reduction of 
nominal reference for facts to sentential reference, so the present 
arguments do not tell against the reduction of fact talk to pro- 
positional talk. It is commonly recognized that the reduction of Y's to 
X's does not require the identity of Y's with X's. But my arguments 
were merely directed against the claim of identity, not of reducibility. 
Even so, the intuitive distinctness of propositions and facts will 
have a direct bearing on how a reduction is to be achieved. For 
suppose that we require a proxy reduction, one in which each entity y 
of Y is identified with a proxy entity y' of X. (See Quine [29] and 
F I R S T - O R D E R  M O D A L  T H E O R I E S  49 
[32].) Let us also suppose that the entities Y of the reduced theory 
include the entities X of the reducing theory and that it is part of the 
reduced theory that some element Y0 of Y is not an X. Then it follows 
that the reduction is not one in which each element of X can be 
identified with itself. For Y0 ~ x holds for each element x of X in the 
reduced theory; so, under self-identification of the X's, we would 
have that the contradiction y~ ~ y~ holds in the reducing theory. 5 
Thus given that it is part of the intuitive theory of facts that facts 
are not propositions, reduction cannot be achieved by identifying 
facts with propositions but leaving the propositions themselves alone. 
This is not to say that a proxy reduction cannot be achieved at all. 
There will be more or less artificial ways of finding proxies for 
propositions that will preserve the relevant distinctness claims. But 
such a reduction will not be as simple as the original identification of 
facts with true propositions would suggest. 
It is also important to emphasize that these strictures only apply to 
proxy reductions, ones in which each entity to be reduced can be 
assigned a proxy from among the entities that reduce. But not all 
reductions are of this sort. 6 An example from modal logic is the 
reduction of possibles to actuals (see [10], especially p. 131). An 
example from classical logic is the reduction of pairs of individuals, in 
which each individual pair quantifier Vp gives way to a pair VxVy of 
individual quantifiers. Later, in sections 5 and 8, we shall also specify 
some non-proxy reductions of fact to proposition theories, obtained 
by eliminating the offending identities prior to apply a standard proxy 
reduction. 
Having distinguished facts from true propositions, we must now 
consider the role of existence in a theory of facts. One naturally talks 
of facts obtaining, not existing, and so the question arises as to the 
relationship between the two. There are various opinions one might 
have here. One is that facts exist, regardless of whether they obtain 
or not. This is a view that might be held by someone who took facts 
to be true propositions; to say that they obtain would then just be 
another way of saying that they were true. Another view is that facts 
exist just in case they obtain; 'obtain' here is a variant on 'exist', not 
'true'. A final view is that facts do not exist at all. This position then 
divides according as to whether it is of ontological significance that 
facts do not exist. On the one hand, one might argue with Moore [22], 
pp. 295, 372) that the difference in usage between 'exists' and 'obtains' 
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or between other such pairs of terms reflects, not an ontological 
distinction, a distinction of being, but a difference in the nature of the 
subjects to which the terms apply. On the other hand, we might argue 
that there is an ontological point to the difference of usage. 
Of these three opinions, the first strikes me as being definitely wrong. 
Indeed, if facts could exist regardless of whether they obtained then 
my arguments against the identity of facts and propositions would 
fail. However, it seems clear that we only say there is a certain fact if 
the fact obtains. But surely the fact cannot exist unless there is the 
fact, i.e., unless it obtains. 
Between the other two opinions, the ordinary use of 'exist' does not 
seem settled enough to decide. However, I am inclined to think that 
there is an important ontological distinction between what one might 
call existence in the narrow sense and being in the broad sense, and it 
may then be true that particulars exist but facts have only being. But 
whether this be so, 7 the obtaining of facts will still be a form of being, 
a form that is attributed to propositions when we say 'there is a 
proposition such that - - - ' .  Using a term for such being, then, in place 
of 'exists', our previous argument against the identity of facts and 
propositions may stand. 
For the purposes of this paper, the distinction between a narrower 
and broader notion of being will not be important, and I have 
therefore found it convenient to use the term 'exists' for the broader 
notion. However, if my arguments are correct, nothing of substance 
will turn on this usage. 
Although I have concentrated my discussion on facts, I would want 
exactly similar considerations to apply to worlds. Thus I would want 
to say that there is singular reference to worlds (something that has 
not been seriously doubted by those who think there is reference at 
all), that worlds are not propositions, and that the obtaining of a 
world consists in some kind of existence. Indeed, if worlds were 
facts, these conclusions would follow from the previous ones. But I 
would want them to hold independently of any claim of subsumption. 
In the case of worlds, a rather special consideration arises in the 
formulation of the modal theory. For we shall want to make essen- 
tialist claims about worlds, to say that necessarily they have certain 
features and so forth. But it has been supposed that this is illegitimate 
and depends upon an illicit union of the semantical meta-theory with 
its object-language. 
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On this question, Prior had no doubt. There was no basis, in his 
philosophy, for a demarcation between world and modal talk and, 
indeed, his favoured way for talking of worlds was in a modal context 
(see [28]). But whether or not we accept Prior's general philosophy of 
modality, it seems clear that necessity, like identity and other logical 
notions, is a universal concept. We may intelligibly ask of any 
proposition whether or not it is necessary, even if it is a proposition 
that itself concerns necessity or possible worlds. 
Moreover, it is often of great significance to make essentialist 
claims about possible worlds. For example, an important difference 
between worlds and instants is that it is essential to a world that what 
hold in it hold in it, but not to an instant. But this is a distinction that 
cannot even be formulated without a modal language for worlds. 
We shall therefore suppose that a first-order modal theory in which 
the variables range over worlds is an object of both interest and 
legitimate study. 
2. PRINCIPLES 
We may now state the various modal principles that govern facts. 
But first, it will be necessary to distinguish between two conceptions 
of facts, the propositional and the worldly; and afterwards, it will be 
helpful, if not essential, to discuss their bearing on an important 
philosophical doctrine, the correspondence theory of truth. 
The Distinction 
Facts may be propositional or worldly, derivative or autonomous. 
This distinction may be variously explained, but perhaps most 
profitably in terms of how the identity of facts is to be accounted for, 
of what one might call their ontological genesis. 8 On the propositional 
conception, the facts will, in a certain sense, be derivative from or 
posterior to the propositions. The proposition will enter, in a certain 
essential way, into the explanation of the identity of the fact to which 
it corresponds. Thus we will explain what the fact that ~ is by means 
of its relation to the proposition that th. 
The exact nature of the explanation will depend upon the type of 
propositional conception in question. On one view, there will be a 
simple fact-forming operation, F, applying to any true proposition p 
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to yield the corresponding fact F(p), On another, and perhaps more 
plausible, view, there will be a simple operation C of concretization, 
that applies to a property P and an individual x had by P to yield a 
new object C(P, x), the P-hess of x. The facts will then result from 
applying this operation to the property of truth and a proposition. 
Thus, on this view, the facts will belong to a broader category of 
objects, that include possibilities, necessities, likelihoods and certain- 
ties, all obtained by 'concretizing' the appropriate property. 9 
In coming to understand ontological genesis, it is helpful to think in 
terms of canonical descriptions. Say that certain objects generate 
another object if they are used to explain its identity. The canonical 
description of an object then displays its ontological genesis, the 
objects from which it is generated and the manner of generation. 
Under this approach, the canonical description of a set of in- 
dividuals would assume the form '{xl, x2, . . .  }', where the outer braces 
signify the set-builder. For a fact, on the other hand, the canonical 
description would either be of the form 'F(p)',  where 'F '  signifies the 
fact-former or else of the form 'C(T,p)' ,  where 'C' signifies the 
concretizer. 
As far as I know, the first philosopher to propound the view of 
facts as the truth of propositions was Moore ([22], pp. 261-2). More 
recently, it has been put forward by Slote [39]. It is, of course, 
essential to distinguish between this view and the view that facts are 
true propositions. Truths are derived from true propositions, not 
identical to them; the truth of a proposition is no more a true 
proposition than the wisdom of a man is a wise man. 
On the worldly conception of facts, their identity will not be 
explained in terms of propositions. It will either be taken as primitive 
or, more plausibly, will independently be explained. On the most 
natural view of this sort, facts will be structured entities or com- 
plexes, built up in certain characteristic ways from their constituents. 
Although propositions will not enter into the analysis of facts on 
this view, there will normally be a correspondence between the 
structure of facts and of propositions, at least on a structural concep- 
tion of propositions. For the operations used to construct the facts will 
correspond to operations of help in constructing the prgpositions. 
Thus just as each subject-predicate fact will be the result I(x, P) of 
applying an operation I of inherence to an individual x and property 
P, so each subject-predicate proposition will be the result i(x, P) of 
applying a like operation i to x and P. 
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There may well be other differences, concomitant with, if not 
consequent to, the distinction as I have drawn it. There is the 
question of whether facts are in the world, part of it (see [2] and 
[41]). It is perhaps difficult to know what such talk amounts to. But on 
one natural use of the phrase, propositions are not in the world, but 
descriptive of it. Since facts, on the propositional view, are even 
further removed from reality, they too would seem to enjoy an 
extra-worldly status. This point becomes especially clear if we think 
of facts, or truths, as belonging to the same general category as 
falsehoods, with the falsehood property replacing the truth property 
in the application of the concretizer. For there is hardly any temp- 
tation to regard falsehoods as in the world. On the non-propositional 
view, by contrast, there would not be the same grounds for denying 
intra-worldly status to facts, and, although there may be other 
grounds, it seems most plausible in this case to suppose that the facts 
are in the world. 
Connected to this question of worldliness is that of determinacy or 
specificity. Roughly, facts are determinate if they cannot obtain in 
different ways. l° (Cf. Moore's distinction in [23], p. 67, between 
non-general and general facts.) It then seems reasonable, if facts are 
to be in the world, that they should be determinate. We will ac- 
knowledge the fact that the sense-datum is of a determinate shade of 
red, but not the fact that it is red or blue or that it is not orange. On 
the propositional conception of facts, however, there is no difficulty 
in accepting a fact for any true proposition. We may, of course, still 
distinguish the determinate facts; but they will then form a sub-class 
of the whole, not in the outer limits of a category. 
The nature of the relation of correspondence will be different on 
the two conceptions. In both cases, the relation will be internal, 
depending, as it does, only upon the internal structures of the entities 
in question. But in the one case, there will not be any inner analysis 
of the proposition but only a simple and direct relationship of it to the 
fact; while in the other case, both proposition and fact must be 
analysed. This becomes especially clear from the canonical descrip- 
tions. For the description of the propositions will be directly embed- 
ded in that of the propositional fact, but merely reflected in the 
description of the worldly fact. Taking the subject-predicate case as 
an example, the one fact will have the description F(i(x, p)), while the 
other will have the description I(x, P). 
We may put the difference thus: on the propositional conception, 
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the analysis of the fact will be parasitic upon that of the correspond- 
ing proposition; on the non-propositional view, the analysis will be 
parallel to that of the proposition. 
On the worldly conception, there may also exist a relation of 
underlying between a proposition and a fact. (I use the term 'underly' 
rather than the more familiar 'verify' in order to emphasize that the 
relation, like correspondence, is a purely structural one.) The way the 
relation works may be gathered from examples. Thus whereas there 
may be no fact corresponding to the true disjunction of p and or, there 
will be a fact which underlies the disjunction, a fact that will either 
correspond to one of p and g or will itself underly one of them." 
The significance of the relation of underlying is this. Whereas, on 
the worldly conception, there may be no fact corresponding to each 
true proposition, it may be held that to each true proposition there is 
an underlying fact that verifies it, should it be true. Thus the facts will 
be determinative of reality, even if they are not in correspondence 
with the true propositions. 
It would certainly be of interest to explicate the nature of this 
relation more fully. This is a task that was begun by the logical 
atomists and that has been pursued, in more recent times, by Van 
Fraassen [45]. However, it is not a question that I shall take up in this 
paper. 
I have talked of two conceptions of facts. But do we have two 
views on a single category of facts, or two categories? My view is 
that we have two categories of objects here. Thus, given an individual 
x and a property P had by x, there will be two fact-type entities that 
may be distinguished, one, F(i(x, P)) or C(T, i(x, P)), parasitic upon 
the proposition, and the other, I(x, P), not. 
But what then comes of my claim that the facts of the theory are 
the ones to which we ordinarily refer? Do we refer to propositional 
facts, to worldly ones, or to some other type of fact altogether? 
Ordinary usage, I think, is usually suggestive of the propositional 
conception, but is not sufficiently definite to exclude the other. If that 
usage allows an interpretation of the term 'fact' under which it is 
problematic that there are disjunctive or negative facts, then some 
sense other than the propositional one would seem to be indicated, t2 
Nor should this referential indeterminacy, crossing categories, 
trouble us. There are many other terms that in ordinary usage are 
ambiguous between categories. The term 'word', for example, can 
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refer either to word-types of word-tokens. Depending on the context, 
the question 'How many words appear in the book?' could concern 
either the one or the other. 
If I am right about the duality of reference, then several theses 
taken to concern facts as a whole should be taken to concern one 
category rather than another. An obvious example is the pair of 
contrasting theses that facts are truths and that facts are in the world. 
These should be taken to relate to the propositional and to the 
worldly conceptions respectively. 
A less obvious example arises from the familiar philosophical query 
as to whether there are disjunctive or negative facts. On the pro- 
positional interpretation, this question is unproblematic. So what can 
be meant? One possibility is that it is being asked whether we can get 
by without disjunctive or negative facts in explaining which pro- 
positions are true. (Cf. the discussion in Russell [36].) But such an 
interpretation does not do justice to our inclination simply to deny 
that there are any disjunctive or negative facts. Another possibility is 
that a special ontological sense of 'there are' is in question. But 
ontological considerations usually cut across categories, not through 
them. Thus it is unclear why one should grant ontological status to 
some of the facts in the given category, but not to the others. A better 
interpretation, that avoids the above problems, is one in which the 
question relates to facts on the worldly, not the propositional, con- 
ception. 
Yet another example, to be discussed later, is provided by criti- 
cisms of the correspondence theory of truth. 
In what follows, it will be helpful to have separate terms for the 
facts from the two categories. For reasons that should already be 
clear, I shall use the term 'truth' for facts from the propositional 
category, though I do not think that it is invariably used with this 
sense. For the facts from the worldly category, I shall use the term 
'circumstance'. In case the category has been fixed or is not im- 
portant, I shall stick to the term 'fact'. 
Identity Principles 
Having distinguished the two types of fact, let us now consider the 
essentialist principles appropriate to each. As with the formulation of 
many other modal theories, these principles are best approached 
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through the study of the existence- and identity-conditions for the 
objects in question. The principles will then be ones that impose the 
conditions on the objects. 
The principles may be internal or external, relative or absolute. 13 
Internal principles are intra-worldly. In regard to existence, they state 
which objects exist within each world; and in regard to identity, they 
state when two objects are identical within a world. The external 
principles are trans-worldly. For existence, they state when an object 
from one world exists in another; and for identity, they state when an 
object from one world is identical to an object from another. In 
stating the existence- or identity-conditions for a given category of 
objects, the objects from another category of objects may be 
presupposed. In this case, the principles are said to be relative to that 
category; and otherwise they are said to be absolute. 
Each distinction may be illustrated by the case of sets. The 
ordinary axioms of set theory (excepting Extensionality) are internal 
existence principles. That (necessarily) a set exists iff its members do 
is an external existence principle. The extensionality axiom itself is an 
internal identity principle, which, in conjunction with the rigidity of a 
set's members from world to world, becomes an external identity 
principle. The existence and identity of a set is explained in terms of 
the existence and identity of its members, respectively, which are 
explained in terms of the existence and identity of their members, and 
so on, until ultimately the existence and identity of the original set is 
explained in terms of individuals (urelements). Thus the various 
principles are relative to the category of individuals. 
Given this division in the principles and our two-fold conception of 
facts, there will be four separate sets of questions to consider. They 
will be treated in turn, beginning with the question of the identity 
principles for truths. 
These principles may be stated in relative fashion, in terms of the 
propositions to which the facts correspond. Recall that, for the 
propositional conception, it was suggested that the fact f should 
correspond to the proposition p just in case it was of the form C(T, p) 
or, perhaps, of the form F(p). If such an account is correct, then from 
the mere fact that C or F or the like is a function, it will follow that 
distinct facts cannot correspond to the same proposition. But it also 
seems reasonable that the same facts should not correspond to 
distinct propositions, that C(T, p) or F(p) should vary with p. We are 
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thus led to what might be called the one-one thesis, viz. that the 
relation of correspondence between propositions and facts is one-one. 
This principle then reduces the question of the identity of facts, 
within a given world, to the identity of propositions. For under the 
assumption, which we shall later grant, that for each fact there is a 
proposition to which it corresponds, two facts will be identical iff the 
propositions to which they correspond are identical. 
The question of the identity of propositions is, of Course, an 
independent matter. But on a broadly structural conception of prop- 
ositions, we may suppose that their identity is explained in terms of 
their structure. The identity of facts might then also be explained in 
structural terms, without the detour through propositions; for the fact 
will inherit whatever structure is possessed by the proposition. But 
there is something non-fundamental about such an account, since the 
attribution of structure to the fact must itself be explained in terms of 
the corresponding proposition. 
A formulation of the internal identity principles for circumstances 
may also be given in terms of the correspondence with propositions. 
Recall that, on the non-propositional conception, it seems most 
plausible to suppose that fact and proposition correspond just in case 
they have parallel structure. Now a priori, this is compatible with the 
relation of correspondence being many-one, one-many or even many- 
many. Thus it may be that the facts I(x, P) and I(y, Q) are distinct, 
even when the propositions i(x, P) and i(y, Q) are the same. It seems 
most reasonable, though, to suppose that the relevant structure of 
both facts and propositions is unique or, at least, variable in the same 
way. Under this assumption, the relation of correspondence between 
propositions and facts will again be one-one. 
However, in this case, the formulation of the identity conditions in 
terms of correspondence will not be fundamental; for the relation of 
correspondence must itself be explained in terms of the structure 
possessed by facts and propositions. Since facts now have a structure 
on their own account, the most direct formulation of the identity 
conditions will be in terms of that structure, with facts being the 
same, at least under the simplest assumptions, just in case their 
structure is the same. 
Given the internal identity principles, the formulation of the exter- 
nal principles is a straightforward matter. For the relation of cor- 
respondence or the constitutive structure of a fact is rigid; it does not 
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vary from world to world. Thus a fact may be identified across worlds 
in terms of the corresponding proposition or constitutive structure, 
and the principles that guarantee this will be ones that express the 
rigidity of correspondence or of those relations that are definitive of 
structure. 
Although the account of the identity conditions for facts in terms of 
propositions or propositional structure is very natural, there is an 
opposing, and quite different, account in terms of what one might call 
empirical content. Under this account, two facts will be identical 
when they necessarily co-exist, i.e. when it is necessary that the one 
exist just in case the other does. This new principle might then be 
applied to either truths or circumstances. 
In application to truths, at least, it will usually diverge from the 
previous propositional criterion. There is one circumstance in which 
the two criteria will agree. For let it be supposed that propositions are 
also subject to an empirical criterion of identity, with necessarily 
equivalent propositions being the same, and let it further be supposed 
that distinct facts cannot correspond to the same proposition. Then 
given the reasonable assumption that (necessarily) a fact exists iff the 
(or a) corresponding proposition is true, the present empirical cri- 
terion of identity for facts is readily seen to follow. 
Assuming, however, a structural criterion of identity for proposi- 
tions, there will be facts corresponding to distinct, though necessarily 
equivalent, propositions; and so the present criterion will run into 
conflict with the previous assertion of the one-one thesis. 
The present criterion, once it is detached from questions of pro- 
positional identity, is best seen as arising from the demand that facts 
be empirical entities. Roughly speaking, we may say that empirical 
entities are ones that are empirically distinguishable, where empirical 
distinctions are ones that make a possible difference to the world. 
How the difference shows up depends upon the nature of the entities 
in question. Two (simple) individuals will be empirically distinguish- 
able if it is possible for the one to exist and the other not. Thus 
necessarily existent individuals will be empirically indistinguishable 
and there will be at most one empirical necessary existent individual. 
On the other hand, two properties of individuals will be empirically 
distinguishable if it is possible for the one to apply to an individual 
empirically distinguishable from all of the individuals to which the 
other property applies. Thus necessarily co-extensive properties will 
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be empirically indistinguishable and only one empirical property will 
have a given extension in each possible world. 
Applying the simplest of these criteria to facts then yields the 
present criterion, that facts should be the same when they necessarily 
coexist. 
Such a conception of facts was upheld by Ramsey ([33], p. 146) 
and, in this form, criticized by Moore ([23], p. 175). However, 
Ramsey's view differs on two counts from the one being proposed 
here. First, he would have held a similar view on propositions and 
so still would have maintained that the correspondence relation was 
one-one (had he been prepared to think in these terms). Second, his 
necessity was analytical or logical, whereas mine is metaphysical. 
As with the previous distinction between the propositional and 
worldly conceptions, we may ask whether the present distinction 
between the empirical and structural conceptions reflects a genuine 
difference of view or merely of subject-matter. Again, I am inclined 
to think that two distinct categories of fact-type entities can be 
distinguished, one satisfying an empirical and the other a quasi- 
structural criterion of identity. Moreover, this classification, at least in 
principle, will cut across the previous one, resulting in a potentially 
fourfold division of entities. 
However, it is not clear that ordinary usage is neutral, in this case, 
on the question of whether facts are to be subject to an empirical or 
structural criterion of identity. As I shall later suggest, circumstances 
already are empirical entities and so no separate question arises here. 
But when it comes to truths, ordinary usage seems to favour the 
structural criterion. Thus we acknowledge that someone may be 
surprised at the truth of G6del's Incompleteness Theorem yet not at 
some simple arithmetical truth, even though both truths necessarily 
obtain. 
There are, however, certain philosophical contexts that favour the 
empirical account. We ask: is there a fact (a truth to the effect) that 
two nations are at war in addition to a certain complex fact about 
people or is there but a single fact? Now this question may, rather 
misleadingly, be about the particular circumstances in which two 
nations are at war. In this case, it concerns the worldly conception and is 
not to the point. But it may also be about a highly general truth, one that 
can hold in a multiplicity of ways. In this case, there would appear to be 
two truths in the ordinary sense of the term; one about nations and the 
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other about people. But the point of the question is whether there is 
anything more, empirically, to two nations being at war than a certain 
complex behaviour of people. Thus the question is one that takes the 
truths or facts to be empirical entities. 
If I am right about ordinary usage, then this use of 'fact' is 
somewhat technical. Thus we have here a case in which a new class 
of entities is introduced in order to meet a certain theoretical demand 
- in this case, from ontological inquiry. 
But whether or not empirical facts are objects of ordinary 
reference or a philosopher's invention, it will be important to inquire 
further into their nature and their relationship to facts as structurally 
conceived. For empirical truths (not truths that are contingent, but 
truths that are subject to an empirical criterion of identity), the only 
acceptable view appears to be that they are abstractions from the 
structural truths, in much the same way as directions are abstractions 
from lines. We note that different truths may have the same empirical 
content. Given that our interest is only in that empirical content, we 
then abstract from truths with the same empirical content to obtain 
the empirical truths. 
On this view, the identity of the empirical truths will be explained 
in terms of propositions, but by means of a double operation. First, 
the truths, as structurally conceived, will be obtained from the pro- 
positions by means of some operation such as the fact-former or 
concretizer. Then the empirical truths will be obtained from structural 
ones by means of an operation of abstraction. Thus the empirical 
truths will be twice removed, or thrice removed if we include the 
genesis of the proposition, from the underlying reality. 
On the other hand, in the case of circumstances, one may have a 
totally different view on the nature of the empirical facts. On the 
propositional conception, it seemed impossible that the facts should 
be subject both to a structural and to an empirical criterion of 
identity; for each true proposition was to correspond to a fact and so 
distinct, but necessarily equivalent propositions, would correspond to 
distinct facts. To take a simple example, the fact that (p A q)V 
(p A --q) would be necessarily co-existent, for any true p, with the 
fact that p and yet distinct on any reasonable structuralist criterion. 
However, on the worldly conception, the means for constructing 
the facts are severely constrained and so there would not be the same 
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difficulties in reconciling the two criteria of identity. Let us grant, for 
example, that the means are limited to operations of inherence (I) and 
of "conjunction". Then although there would be interesting problems 
in determining what the underlying relations and particulars could be 
like, there would seem to be no essential difficulty in supposing the 
resulting facts to be subject to both the structuralist and empirical 
criteria of identity. Indeed, it might be taken to be the distinctive 
feature of facts in the world, as opposed to propositions or truths, 
that they combined the features of being empirical and of possessing 
proposition-like structure. 
Such an account of circumstances might help to explain the special 
nature of necessity and its significance for metaphysics. We may ask: 
what are the ontological grounds for statements of metaphysical 
necessity? One answer is that such statements are true merely in 
virtue of one proposition being a logical consequence of other pro- 
positions. Thus on such a view, there would be no distinctive ontolo- 
gical ground for metaphysical necessities; all such necessities would 
be grounded in the relatively unproblematic case of logical im- 
plications. But an alternative answer is that such necessities rest, at 
least in part, on the identity of facts. Thus what makes it true that 
necessarily if people do certain things then two nations are at war is 
that there is but one fact in the world. The most obvious objection to 
any such account of ontological ground would be that it is circular; 
but no objection of this sort applies in the present case, since the 
identity of the facts may be independently explained in terms of their 
structure. 
We might then see the interest of metaphysics in necessity as 
derivative. Ultimately, our interest is in what the facts are. We wish 
to know whether there are facts ('in the world') about nations in 
addition to facts about people, or facts about material things in 
addition to facts about experience. But given the empirical criterion 
of identity for facts, these questions of identity convert to questions 
of entailment, and hence give rise to our interest in necessity. 
One might take this line of thought even further. For I have so far 
assumed that the worldly facts or circumstances are structured enti- 
ties. But what if we drop this assumption and suppose that circum- 
stances are subject only to the empirical criterion of identity (the 
facts would be empirical nuggets, devoid of internal structure). There 
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would then be no difficulty in supposing that each true proposition 
corresponded to a circumstance, and so we could define necessity in 
terms of the identity of facts. 
Such a suggestion is, in fact, to be found in the literature. It was 
first put forward by Malcolm [20]. Unfortunately, his actual definition 
is subject to difficulties, that were pointed out by Toms [44]. A correct 
definition was later given by Prior [25]; but it requires the notion of 
fact containment, which smacks too much of the notion of necessity 
to be completely helpful. A correct definition, that avoids fact con- 
tainment and merely requires the fact - that operator q in addition to 
standard logical notions, may be given by taking ~b to be necessarily 
equivalent to ~ just in case there is a fact that ~ and an identical fact 
that ~ or there is a fact that not-& and an identical fact that - ~ (in 
symbols, 3 f ( f  = qq5 ^ f = q~0) v ~f(f  = q -  cb ^ f = q -  4)). TM Given 
the notion of necessary equivalence, the other modal notions may 
then be defined in the usual way. 
Of course, the above definition is correct even when empirical facts 
are treated as abstractions from truths. But it is then circular, since 
the empirical facts themselves must be explained in terms of neces- 
sity. The present suggestion is that the empirical facts be given 
independently of necessity, by the world so to speak, and that the 
notion of necessity then be explained in terms of it. 
Such an account would immediately justify our previous views on 
the ontological ground for necessities and on their significance for 
metaphysics; for the analysis of any statement involving necessities 
would be in terms of factual identities. Thus the claim that statements 
concerning nations were equivalent to statements concerning people 
would be analyzed in terms of the identity of facts concerning nations 
and people - and not conversely, as is commonly supposed. 
But despite the attractions of this more extended view, it is not one 
that I can accept. For we are not justified in taking as primitive a 
whole host of facts corresponding to each true proposition and, even 
if we were, it would still not be clear how the application of the fact - 
that operator to sentences was to be understood in the absence of any 
structural identity criterion for facts or of any appeal to the notion of 
necessity. The most the world provides are circumstances cor- 
responding to a limited class of propositions. The other facts are to be 
understood in terms of propositions and, if they are empirical, in 
terms of the notion of necessity as well. 
F I R S T - O R D E R  M O D A L  T H E O R I E S  63 
Existence Principles 
Let us now consider the existence principles for facts, first for truths 
and then for circumstances. What truths are there in each world? An 
answer may be given in terms of the corresponding propositions. For 
to each true proposition there corresponds a fact. Conversely, each 
fact corresponds to a true proposition. So the truths of each world are 
exactly those that correspond to the true propositions. 
Given that we know what propositions there are in each world and 
when a proposition corresponds to a fact, these principles then enable 
us to determine what facts there are in each world. It reduces the 
internal existence question for facts to that for propositions. 
The internal existence principles for circumstances may be stated 
in similar fashion, but in terms of the correspondence with a sub-class 
of true propositions, the definite ones. But this formulation is not the 
most basic, since the notion of a definite proposition must somehow 
be made out. It would be preferable to characterize what circum- 
stances there are directly in terms of the means available for their 
construction, be they inherence and conjunction or some other class 
of operations. 
The external principles of existence for truths and circumstances 
may also be given a common form. The question is: when does a fact 
from one world exist within another? And the answer, again in terms 
of the corresponding proposition, is: just in case the corresponding 
proposition is true. Thus we are led to the principle that (necessarily) 
a fact will exist iff the, or a, corresponding proposition is true. 
Since the corresponding propositions will also have truth-con- 
ditions, the existence-conditions for the facts may be stated in terms 
of those truth-conditions, without the detour through propositions. 
Thus in case the fact is atomic (subject-predicate), we may say that it 
exists iff the given particulars exemplify the relation; and in case the 
fact is conjunctive, we may say that it exists iff each of the conjunct 
facts exists. Proceeding in this way, we may then give a recursive 
characterization of the existence conditions for any fact. However, 
whereas this characterization will be the most basic for the circum- 
stances, it will be less basic for the truths, arising as it does, from the 
combination of the existence-conditions in terms of propositions and 
the truth-conditions for those propositions. 
The external existence conditions are indicative of one of the most 
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distinctive features of facts, viz. the intimate connection between 
factual existence and propositional truth. However, it is hard to state 
exactly what is so special about this connection. It is not that the 
existence conditions of a fact are the truth-conditions of some pro- 
position. For given any object whatever, its existence conditions will 
be the truth-conditions of a proposition, viz. the proposition that the 
object exists. In the case of facts, though, the proposition can be 
stated without circularity, not as the proposition that the fact exists, 
but as the proposition that gives the inner content of the fact. 
Moreover, the fact and the corresponding proposition, that gives its 
existence-conditions, will stand in a peculiarly intimate relationship. 
For there will be a purely internal or structural connection between 
the two. It will be possible to read off the proposition from the fact; 
and so the fact, unlike other entities, might be said to bear its 
existence-conditions on its face. Finally, for truths though not for 
circumstances, we may note that there is a generality in the con- 
nection between factual existence and propositional truth. For al- 
though the existence conditions of any entity are the truth-conditions 
of some proposition, a converse relationship holds for truths, with 
each true proposition being the existence-conditions of some truth. 
And in this respect, the category of facts, and its cognates, would 
appear to be quite special. 
Although the above existence principles may appear to be very 
reasonable, they are open to a subtle, yet severe, objection. For 
consider the proposition that Socrates does not exist. In some pos- 
sible world, this proposition is true. But is there, in that world, a fact 
that Socrates does not exist? 
I think not; for how can the fact exist when the individual does 
not? The principle "no individual, no fact" has a great deal of 
intuitive appeal. But it can also be taken to derive from the more 
general structuralist principle "no constituent, no complex". In other 
words, when an object, the complex, is constructed from other 
objects, its constituents, then the complex cannot exist unless the 
constituents do. Let it now be granted that facts are complexes and 
that the objects which they are in the relevant sense about are their 
constituents. Then the principle of no fact without the individual will 
follow. 
It is essential to this piece of reasoning, though, that we take an 
objectualist stand on facts, according to which individuals, as 
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opposed to their concepts, can actually be constituents of facts, I 
think that such a stand is justified for propositions, and for circum- 
stances it would appear to be even more plausible; for in so far as 
facts relate to the world and not to our conception of it, there would 
not be the same reasons for supposing that their constituents were 
purely conceptual. For truths, the validity of the objectualist stand is 
perhaps more problematic. If propositions are actually constituents of 
the corresponding truths, then objectualism propositions will imply 
objectualism for truths. But although propositions are used to explain 
the identity of truths, it might be held that they are not constituents of 
those truths. In this case, objectualism for the truths might well fail. 
However, we may then give an alternative justification of the prin- 
ciple "no individual, no fact". For we may suppose that the general 
structuralist principle of no complex without a constituent is replaced 
by the more general ontological principle that the identity of any 
existent object, when it stands in need of explanation, is to be 
explained in terms of other objects that exist. The previous struc- 
turalist principle would then be a consequence of this ontological 
principle, granted that the identity of a complex must always be 
explained in terms of its constituents. But we may suppose that the 
ontological principle also applies in cases in which the explanatory 
objects are not actually constituents of the object to be explained. 
Given that the propositions and hence, ultimately, their individual 
constituents were required to explain the identity of truths, the 
required principle would then follow. 
As far as I know, Prior [26] was the first modern philosopher to 
insist on these principles for the existence of facts or propositions 
and to stress their importance for metaphysics and logic; though 
whether he would have accepted our structuralist or more general 
ontological arguments for them I do not know. 
If the objectualist requirement on the existence of facts is accepted, 
then both the internal and external existence principles must be 
modified. In stating the external condition, two requirements on the 
existence of the fact should be laid down, one deriving from its 
propositional and the other from its objectualist content. 15 First, it 
should be required that the corresponding proposition be true, and 
second, that the objects which it is about exist. In stating the internal 
principles, on the other hand, it should be required that the given 
proposition both exist and be true for there to be a corresponding fact, 
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In many cases, the objectualist requirement will be included in the 
propositional one. This will be true, for example, of any subject- 
predicate fact in which the relation only applies to existents. Indeed, 
it might be argued that there must always be this inclusion of 
requirements for circumstances, so that, in this case, no reformulation 
of the existence principle need be given. However, for truths it is 
clear that the two requirements can come apart. It is necessary for the 
existence of the proposition that Socrates or Plato is a philosopher, 
for example, that both Socrates and Plato exist, though not necessary 
for its truth. 
Fortunately, there is a convenient way of combining both require- 
ments in the formulation of the various principles. Let us distinguish 
between the inner and the outer truth of a proposition. A proposition 
has outer truth if it is simply true and it has inner truth if, in addition, 
it exists. Thus the proposition that Socrates does not exist has outer 
truth in a world in which Socrates does not exist, but not inner truth. 
We may now retain the original formulation of our principles, but 
substitute inner for outer truth. Thus the external existence principle 
will now say that the existence set of a fact is the inner, not outer, 
truth-set of a corresponding proposition; and similarly for internal 
existence. 
Although the difference between the objectual and anti-objectual 
approaches may appear slight, the consequences for the theory of 
facts will be great. On the technical side, we may note that a large 
part of the interest of the formal work will arise from the adoption of 
the objectualist requirement. As in the case of propositions (see [15]), 
it will be necessary to formulate adequate semantic conditions on 
models in terms of automorphisms and not merely in straightforward 
set-theoretic terms, and ,  once this is done, the status of the resulting 
theories will be drastically altered, from decidable to undecidable and 
from axiomatizable to non-axiomatizable. 
On the philosophical side, we may note, first of all, that objec- 
tualism for facts leads to a new perspective on the existence of 
propositions. Call a construction (existentially) transparent if no more 
is required for an object constructed by its means than the existence 
of the objects to which it applies; and otherwise call the construction 
opaque. Then before it was supposed that all propositions were 
obtained by means of transparent constructions, so that, ultimately, 
the existence of the proposition would only depend upon the in- 
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dividuals from which it was constructed. But the fact-former F or 
concretizer C are opaque constructions. The existence of F(O) or of 
C(T, p) not only depends upon the existence of p, but also on its 
truth. Therefore if facts themselves enter into the construction of 
propositions, there will be no guarantee that the existence of the 
propositions can ultimately be traced back to the existence of their 
individual constituents. 
This point may then go some way towards explaining why the means 
for constructing circumstances should so severely be constrained. Why 
is there not 'in the world' a disjunctive or a negative fact? One possible 
answer is this. Suppose there were a disjunctive fact. Then it would 
be the result of applying a disjunctive operation to the two disjunct 
facts. So by general structural considerations, the existence of the two 
disjunct facts would be necessary (and presumably also suflicient) for 
the existence of the disjunctive fact. But then the disjunctive fact would 
be indistinguishable in its existence-conditions from the corresponding 
conjunctive fact and so, by the empirical criterion of identity, would be 
identical to it. A similar argument applies to negative facts. And more 
generally, it should be clear why, from this point of view, the only 
truth-functional mode for constructing facts should be that correspond- 
ing to conjunction. 
The Correspondence Theory 
The various existence principles have an obvious bearing on the 
correspondence theory of truth and on attempts at reducing discourse 
concerning facts. We cannot give a thorough account of all of the 
issues that arise, but enough can be said to put the remaining formal 
work into some sort of philosophical perspective. 
Put roughly, the correspondence theory states that the truth of a 
proposition is to be explained in terms of its relation to the facts. It 
will be important, however, to distinguish between two fundamentally 
different forms of the theory, one oriented towards the concept of 
truth and the other oriented towards instances of truth. The first 
provides an analysis of the general concept of truth; it says what it is, 
in general, for a proposition to be true. The other attempts to 
articulate the ontological ground for particular truths, to describe in 
the most fundamental terms what it is in the world that accounts for 
those truths. 
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The two versions of theory will assume subtly different forms, 
locating both what is explained, what explains, and the explanatory 
link in different places. The concept-oriented theory will analyse the 
general (open) statement to the effect that a given proposition is true, 
and the analysandum, at least in standard cases, will be to the effect that 
the proposition correspond to or be verified by a fact. The instance- 
oriented theory will attempt to explain how a particular proposition is 
true, and the explicandum will be to the effect that a certain fact 
exists. This fact, in standard cases, will be one that underlies or 
corresponds to the proposition. But that it does will be no part of the 
explanandum. Of course, the explanation may be generalized. We 
may say that for any true proposition, its ontological ground is that a 
certain fact exists, where this is the fact underlying or corresponding 
to the proposition. But we have, then, a general form of explanation, 
not an explanation in general form. 
The distinction becomes particularly sharp once we note that the 
concept of truth is not even required for the formulation of the 
instance-oriented theory. For taking a particular truth, say that the cat 
is on the mat, we might state its ontological ground to be that there is 
a fact that the cat is on the mat. Or if we wish to be more general, we 
may assert, as a sentential scheme, that, for any true sentence 4~, the 
ontological ground for $ is that there is a fact that $. On the other 
hand, for the concept-oriented theory, the concept of truth is essen- 
tial; since otherwise there is nothing to explain. 
Of the two forms of the theory, it is the instance-oriented one that 
is most fundamental. Yet, for the most part, philosophers have 
attended to the concept-oriented theory, and this has introduced 
distortions into the ensuing discussions. This is no clearer than in 
some of the criticisms of the correspondence theory. For it is often 
wondered whether the subjects of truth or the concept of truth can 
legitimately be made out. But whatever validity these points may 
have against the concept-oriented theory, they have no bearing on the 
instance-oriented version, since neither the subjects nor the concept 
of truth are required for its formulation. 
Is our theory of facts committed to either form of the cor- 
respondence theory? It might appear to be. Within the theory of 
truths, we may derive, from the internal existence principles, that 
(necessarily) a proposition is true iff it corresponds to a fact; and with 
the additional help of the external existence principles, it may then be 
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shown that (necessarily) to each true proposition there corresponds a 
fact for which it is necessary that the fact exists iff the proposition is 
true. From the theory of circumstances, the same principle will not be 
derivable; since to each true proposition there will not correspond a 
fact. But from suitable assumptions for the relation of underlying, it 
may be shown that (necessarily) to each true proposition there is an 
underlying fact for which it is necessary that if the fact exists the 
proposition is true. Thus a similar principle may be derived, but with 
a less direct structural connection between the proposition and the 
fact and a weaker modal connection. 
Now although these principles are highly suggestive of the cor- 
respondence theory, neither is constitutive of it. For it is essential to 
the theory not merely that such connections be postulated but also 
they be, in the appropriate sense, explanatory. For the concept- 
oriented form, one requires not merely that a proposition be true iff it 
corresponds to a fact, but also that the concept of truth thereby be 
analysed. For the instance-oriented theory, one requires not merely 
that each true proposition be made true by a fact in the sense that 
necessarily if the fact exists the proposition is true, but also that the 
truth of the particular proposition thereby be explained. 
The principles of the theory give what one might call the modal 
content of the respective forms of the correspondence theory. They 
state what modal truths must be accepted by an upholder of the 
theory. But they do not, conversely, commit the upholder to the 
theories from which they might be derived. 
In the same way, one who accepts the Leibnizian thesis that a 
proposition is necessary iff it is true in all possible worlds does not 
thereby commit himself to the possibilist's analysis of necessity in 
terms of possible worlds. He might, like myself, accept the principle 
and yet analyse possible worlds in terms of necessity in such a way 
that the truth of the principle can still be maintained. No matter how 
appealing a particular analysis, the mere assertion of an underlying 
equivalence does not commit one to the claim that it is an analysis. 
In order to distinguish the underlying modal principles from the 
correspondence theory, let us call them correspondence theses. Even 
if the theses themselves do not constitute a theory, the question still 
arises as to when they can be of explanatory value. It is helpful here 
to distinguish between truths and circumstances. For truths, the 
proposed explanations will all be circular. For we explain what it is 
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for a fact to exist, say F(O) or C(T, O) in terms of the truth of the 
corresponding proposition. This means that the explanatory link be- 
tween the truth of a particular proposition and the existence of a fact 
will run in exactly the opposite direction to that required by the 
correspondence theory; for it is the truth of the proposition that will 
explain the existence of the fact, not vice versa. In the same way, it is 
an object's being such and such that will explain its membership in a 
set, not the other way round. Moreover, on the concretizer view, the 
relation of correspondence will be explained in terms of the concept 
of truth, with f corresponding to 0 just in case f = C(T, p). So in this 
case, there will be a double circularity in the definition of truth as 
correspondence to fact, with one circularity arising from the attribu- 
tion of existence to a fact and the other from reference to the 
correspondence relation. 
Several other philosophers have also argued against the explana- 
tory value of the various correspondence theses. But they have 
usually argued against this on the basis of some simple-minded 
reduction of discourse concerning facts. Some have supposed that 
facts are to be identified with true propositions. This then makes it 
natural to interpret the obtaining of a fact as the truth of a proposition 
and the correspondence of fact and proposition as identity; so that it 
becomes a simple logical truth that to each true proposition there is a 
corresponding fact. Others have treated the fact quantifiers as sub- 
stitutional quantifiers over sentences and then have interpreted the 
other parts of speech in such a way that the various theses are again 
truths of a broadly logical kind. In either case, the application of the 
reduction to a correspondence thesis dispels any appearance of 
explanatory value that it may possess. 
Now I am not against reduction as such, even for circumstances; 
and it seems likely that any reduction will eliminate the explanatory 
value of the correspondence theses. For once the proposed explanans 
is reduced, the reference to facts will appear to be redundant. 
However, I do object to the idea that the reduction can proceed 
through any simple-minded identification of facts with true pro- 
positions or of fact-terms with true sentences. There is the previous 
difficulty over identity, but more important is the point that facts 
themselves may figure in propositions. 
The difficulty may be illustrated by a simple example. Take any true 
proposition 0 (that exists). Let f be the corresponding fact and 15 the 
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proposition that f exists. Then it is clear that the existence-set of t5 
coincides with its truth-set and with the inner truth-set of p. We may 
call a proposition coincident when its truth- and existence-set coin- 
cide. Then what we have established is that for each true proposition 
p there is a coincident proposition t5 with the same inner truth-set. 
Now this is a conclusion lying entirely within the theory of pro- 
positions. Yet its truth arises from the admission of facts; for there 
would be no reason, in general, to suppose that each fact coincided in 
its existence-condition with some constellation of individuals. But this 
means that no reduction will be correct if, like the standard ones, it 
leaves the pure theory of propositions alone. 
An acceptable reduction must proceed along different lines. It is 
most natural first to expand the domain of propositions so as to 
include those with facts as constituents, and then to reduce facts to 
the resulting propositions and those propositions to the original ones - 
with the whole process being re-iterated once structuralist, as well as 
modal, considerations are taken into account. The standard attempts 
at reduction are inspired by the idea of a simple grammatical trans- 
formation. It is hoped that this, rather than an inner probing into the 
structure of the propositions and facts, might secure the desired 
result. But this ignores what one might call the creative aspect of 
facts, with the need not only to push out the domain once, but 
repeatedly in response to the application of the different construc- 
tions. 
In this respect, facts might be compared to sets and properties or to 
other "logical" entities of this kind. All of them enjoy a suitable form 
of abstraction principle (with the principle for facts being that, for 
each true sentence ~b, there is a fact such that it is necessary that the 
fact exists iff ~b and the objects of ~b exist.) If attention is confined to 
simple abstracts, defined on expressions from the base language, then 
they may be eliminated by means of a simple grammatical trans- 
formation. Once quantification over arbitrary, yet non-iterative, enti- 
ties is introduced, this can no longer be done, although there may be a 
simple "grammatical" reduction to entities of another kind. But once 
unrestricted quantification over entities from different categories is 
allowed, the simple character of the reduction is perforce lost, since 
the results of applying one construction will now figure as the 
arguments for the application of another construction. 
When we turn to circumstances, the status of the correspondence 
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theory is rather different. We may note first that an exact form of the 
theory can longer be retained, since to each true proposition there will 
not correspond a circumstance. Rather the exact match between true 
proposition and fact must give way to the less direct relation of 
underlying. Thus if a correspondence theory of truth is to be plausi- 
ble, it is the verification by facts, not the correspondence with 
propositions, that is to be the key relation. 
However, even this modified form of the theory is subject to 
difficulties. These centre not so much on the circularity of the 
proposed explanations; for in contrast to truths, the existence of 
circumstances and the relation of underlying are most directly 
explained in structuralist terms, without the reference to propositions. 
Rather, the difficulties concern the irrelevance of facts to the pro- 
posed explanation. For always we may ask, when facts are used to 
explain truth, why the relationships among the constituents of the 
facts should not be used in their place. Consider subject-predicate 
propositions of the form x and P. Why should we not explain the 
truth of such propositions in terms of the particular exemplifying the 
property or even deny that any non-trivial explanation can or need be 
given? What does the explanation in terms of facts add to the 
explanation that avoids them? 
One possible answer is that it is only through the reference to facts 
that we can give expression to some form of realism. But it is 
necessary here to distinguish between a general realist position in 
regard to a given subject-matter and a more distinctive realist position 
in regard to the corresponding facts. Often the point of stating the 
correspondence theory is to suggest a general realist position. Thus 
one finds philosophers denying that there are moral facts as a way of 
expressing moral anti-realism. But the use of facts to this end is 
completely idle. For there is a perfectly innocuous sense in which we 
may talk of the moral facts, or the facts of any other subject-matter, 
even if we are anti-realists in the given area. And if we insist that the 
facts are to be ones acceptable to a realist, then we can equally well 
insist that the particulars and properties, in their relationships of 
exemplification, are to be acceptable to the realist. Whether we give 
an account of truth in terms of facts or in terms of their constituents, 
there is nothing in the accounts as such to suggest either a realist or 
anti-realist position. Whatever the explanation of the distinction be- 
tween the two positions, it is presumably one that lies elsewhere] 6 
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But although facts are of no help in expressing realism in regard to 
a given subject-matter, there may be a point, once such a realism is 
presupposed, in espousing a distinctive realism in regard to the facts. 
For suppose we ask how a concrete individual comes to exemplify a 
given property, either in general or in a particular case. Now one 
answer is that there is nothing to explain here, that this is a place 
where explanation must stop. But from another point of view, it is 
highly mysterious that a particular should exemplify a property; for 
the property is an abstract object, divorced as such from any parti- 
cular, and the particular is a concrete object, divorced as such from 
any property. How then can they come together in the distinctive 
manner required by exemplification? 
If the demand for an explanation is accepted, then another possible 
reply to our question is that this coming together should be explained 
in terms of a unity, a fact to which both constituents belong. It is not 
that the existence of the fact is to be explained in terms of the 
particular exemplifying the relation, since that leaves the nature of 
the relationship unexplained. Rather the exemplification itself must be 
explained in terms of the fact. 
If this were so, then both the instance- and the concept-oriented 
versions of the correspondence theory would require the appeal to 
facts. For the fundamental ontological ground for any true pro- 
position would presumably consist, either wholly or in part, in the 
existence of certain atomic facts, and definitions of truth for pro- 
positions would presumably lead back to logical relations like exem- 
plification, which would then have to be analysed in terms of facts. 
But whether any form of fact realism is reasonable is hard to say. 
The question is an instance of the more general issue of holism, of 
whether properties and relations of parts are to be analysed in terms 
of the wholes to which they belong, or vice versa. In some cases, it 
seems clear whether or not a holistic or non-holistic form of explana- 
tion is called for. It seems clear, for example, that what it is for two 
people to be married is to be explained in terms of various socio-legal 
relationships and not in terms of their belonging to a unifying entity, 
the marriage. On the other hand, it seems plausible that physical 
instants and points should be analysed in terms of larger physical 
units. 
But whatever the answer in the present case, it is important to 
insist on the legitimacy of the issue. It has too readily been assumed 
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that because facts are redundant for ordinary purposes they are 
valueless for the formulation of philosophical doctrine. But let it be 
granted that reference to facts can be eliminated from all ordinary 
contexts. It would still be in order for the philosopher to insist that 
the reduction respect his intuitions on ontological ground and to 
reject it if it broke the explanatory link between the truth of a 
proposition and the existence of a fact. The philosopher need not be 
so self-effacing that he cannot make demands on the adequacy of a 
reduction that arise solely from the needs of his own discipline. 
3. P U R E  W O R L D  T H E O R I E S  
We shall prove some simple results on the pure modal theory of 
worlds. 
It will be helpful, at the outset, to display some of the languages we 
shall be considering in the rest of the paper. Recall from [11] that a 
language is specified by its set of non-logical predicates. The formulas 
of the language are then constructed from the non-logical predicates, 
the 'logical' predicates E and = ,  and the logical operations in the 
usual way. 
There are five main languages in all: 
(i) ~w, the pure language of worlds. There are n o  non-logical 
predicates, and the intended range of the variables w l ,  w 2  . . . .  is 
worlds. 
(ii) ~P, the pure language of propositions. The sole non-logical 
predicate is T (for truth), and the variables pl, p2,. • • are to range over 
propositions; 
(iii) ~r, the pure language of facts. There are again n o  non-logical 
predicates. The variables f~, f2 . . . .  are to range over facts. 
(iv) ~P'f, the language of propositions and facts. The predicates are 
T (for truth) and P (for is a proposition). The variables x~, x2, . . ,  are 
to range over facts and propositions. The symbols p~, p2,. . ,  will be 
used for variables relativized to propositions, and the symbols 
fl, f2 . . . .  for variables relativized to facts (non-propositions). 
(v) ~p,~.c, the language of propositions and facts, with cor- 
respondence. This is like the language 2g p'~ above, but for the addition 
of a two-place predicate C (for correspondence). 
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Occasionally, we shall admit languages of the same general sort and 
languages of different sorts; but these will be specially indicated as 
the need arises. 
Note that we have departed from the official policy in [11] of using 
~Xl', 'x2' , . . .  for variables. Nothing turns on this; it is merely to help 
the reader recall the intended interpretation. 
I shall sometimes use the same symbols, both as object-language 
variables and as recta-linguistic variables for elements of a model. No 
confusion should arise from this practice; but where there is danger 
that it may, I shall underscore the object-language variables. 
The language S~ ~ for worlds is the simplest kind of modal language, 
completely devoid of any special predicates. Its only predicates are 
the 'universal' ones for existence and identity, and, for this reason, 
such languages, and the theories based upon them, may be said to be 
ones of pure existence and identity. In principle, though not permitted 
by our definitions, such a language might omit either the existence or 
the identity predicate, and in these cases we talk, respectively, of pure 
identity and pure existence languages. 
In classical logic, languages and theories of such expressive paucity 
have little interest, either as objects of technical study or as the 
means for formalizing a given subject-matter. For all that can be 
expressed within them are simple facts, statable in obvious normal 
form, concerning the cardinality of the universe. In modal logic, on 
the other hand, such languages are of far greater interest. For despite 
their meagre means, they permit the expression of highly complex 
facts, statable in no obvious normal form, concerning the distribution 
of existents from one world to another, and they thereby allow for the 
formulation of theories of both technical and philosophical interest. 
The structures ~ for the language ~fw will simply be of the form 
(W, A), where W(worlds) is a non-empty set and Aw (individuals of 
w) is non-empty for at least one w. The truth-definition will then 
proceed in the usual way. But note: in accord with the actualist 
intuitions of §2, the variables will range, in each world, not over all 
worlds, but only over that world. 
Let W-Th be the theory whose axioms are as follows: 
World Existence I--]3 wEw;  
World Identity []VwVv (w = v). 
According to World Existence, necessarily there is an actual world; 
and according to World Identity, necessarily there is at most one 
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actual world. It is these axioms that justify our talk of the actual 
world or of what  would, counteffactually,  be the actual world. We 
could have added a constant w0 for the actual world to our language. 
But for most  purposes such a constant  would be redundant,  since 
each formula 4,(w0) could be replaced by 3w4,(w). 
A word on nomenclature.  We shall be referring to theories and sets 
of conditions, each pertaining to one of the languages ~w, Alp, ~f,  ~p,f 
or ~o.s.c. The language in question will be indicated by a suitable 
pref ix--W, P, F, etc., and whether  the object  is a theory or a set of 
conditions will be indicated by the use of 'Th'  or 'Cond. ' .  Thus W-Th is 
a theory of worlds, while P -Cond  is a set of conditions for pro- 
positions. Sometimes the prefixes will be used to distinguish axioms 
for the different languages that bear the same name and other variants 
on the notation may be introduced in an obvious manner. 
Le t  us briefly indicate some syntactic results for the theory W-Th. 
First, it is readily shown that the two axioms of the theory are 
independent.  Secondly,  it may be shown that the sentence 
[-2Vwt-]Vv[w = v -- <>(Ew ^ Ev)] is a theorem. Hence identity may be 
defined in terms of modality and existence. It may be wondered,  more 
generally: when can identity be defined within a model theory T, i.e. 
when can one find an identity-free formula (b such that ([]) 
Ix = y - 4,] is a theorem of T. Say that two individuals e, f ~ A of a 
modal structure ~ are absolutely indiscernible if w ~Re~e2. . .  e, iff 
w ~ R f l f 2 . . .  f ,  whenever  w ~ W, el . . . . .  e,, f~ . . . . .  f ,  ~ A and ei = fi 
or ei, fj ~ {e, f} for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n. A similar definition may be given 
in the classical case. Then it is a consequence of Beth's Definability 
Theorem,  in the case of classical logic, that identity is definable in a 
theory iff the theory admits of no models with distinct absolute 
indiscernibles. It is natural to suppose that the corresponding result 
holds for modal logic. However ,  it is shown in [12] that Beth's 
Definability fails in quantified $5, and I conjecture that the result 
would also fail for  the special case in which identity is to be defined. 
Le t  World Completeness be the scheme: 
U1)[(Ew ^ 4,) ~ ~q(Ew ~ 4,)]. 
Then,  finally, we may note that this scheme is a theorem of W-Th for 
any formula 4,. Indeed, in any theory,  the scheme is equivalent to 
those of its instances in which 4, is an atomic formula whose 
predicate is either non-logical or else E. Thus in the present  case, the 
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scheme is simply equivalent to []Vwf--1Vv(Ew D [](Ew D Ev)), which 
is a consequence of identity. 
The principles of World Exis tence and World Completeness have 
already appeared in [16], where they may be obtained from the 
formulas under clauses (i) and (ii) of lemma 4.4 by letting Wx be the 
predication Ex. Hence  all of the relevant results of that section also 
apply to the theory W-Th. In particular, the possibilist quantifier Hw, 
ranging over  all worlds in each world, may be defined in W-Th, and 
the notion of truth-in-a-world defined by means of the formula 
12(Ew ~ ,1,). 
Semantically, the theory W-Th is rather simple. It is readily shown 
that: 
L E M M A  1.92 = (W, fii) is a structure for  W-Th iff Aw is singleton for 
each w E W. 
Of course, not all such 92 will be intended models for  the theory,  
even when W is the set of all possible worlds. So let us say that a 
structure 92 = (W, A) is natural if Aw = {w} for each w. Recall that a 
structure 92 is differentiated if 92w = 92~ implies w = v for  all w, v E W. 
Then it is again readily shown that: 
L E M M A  2. Each differentiated structure 92 for W-Th is isomorphic 
to a natural structure (in the sense that there are separate one-one 
correspondences  for worlds and individuals). 
Let  us use W-Cond. for  the condition of being natural. Then since 
each structure is equivalent to a differentiated structure, it follows 
from the completeness theorem for modal logic that: 
T H E O R E M  3. The theory W-Th is sound and complete for  the 
condition W-Cond.,  i.e. a sentence is a theorem of W-Th iff it is true 
in all models satisfying W-Cond. 
Strong completeness may similarly be proved. 
The theory W-Th has the finite model property and hence is 
decidable. For  it may be shown by an easy induction on the complexi ty 
of ~b(wl, w2 . . . . .  wn) that: 
L E M M A  4. Suppose that &(w~, w2 . . . . .  w,) is a formula of 5¢ w con- 
taining at most n occurrences  of the symbol Fq. Le t  ~)2 = (92, w0) and 
~ = ( r g ,  v0) be natural models of W-Th,  and wl, w 2 , . . . , w ,  and 
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v~, v2 . . . . .  vn elements of W and V respectively for which: 
(i) wi = w i iff vi = vj 
for 0 -  < i  < j  <-n; 
(ii) min(n, card(W - {w0, Wl . . . . .  wn})) 
= min(n, card(V - {v0, vl . . . . .  v,})). 
Then (9~, w0)~ 6(wl, w2 . . . .  , w,) iff (~, v0)~ ~b(v~, v2 . . . . .  v,). 
So it follows that: 
THEOREM 5. The theory W-Th has the finite model property and is 
decidable. 
As should be clear from this proof, the theory W-Th bears an 
intimate relationship to the pure classical theory of identity. There is 
a translation, outlined in section 2 of [11], from any modal language 
and theory into a classical language and theory. Under this trans- 
lation, we may suppose that E*, the enlargement of the existence 
predicate, is simply identity. Conversely, xi = xj in the classical lan- 
gauge may be replaced by (>(Ew~ ^ E w i )  and ~x~ by (>3wi. More 
precisely, if * is the one translation and ' the other, then it may be 
shown that if the classical (modal) formula ~b is a theorem of the classical 
(modal) system then Oh' (~b*) is a theorem of the modal (classical) system, 
and that ~b ~ 4)*' is a theorem of the modal system for each modal 
formula 4). Corresponding semantical results may also be established. 
It is of interest to consider the properties of some of the theories 
weaker than W-Th. Let  W-Th- be the theory whose axioms are 
World Existence and World Completeness. Such a theory would be of 
interest to someone who accepted the (necessary) existence of worlds 
but denied their uniqueness. Then by techniques similar to those used 
in establishing theorem 5, it may be shown that: 
THEOREM 6. The theory T .  W- has the finite model property and is 
decidable. 
Now let W - T h '  be the theory whose sole axiom is World Existence 
and W-Th ° the theory with no axioms at all. 
Then: 
THEOREM 7. The theories W-Th' and W-Th ° are undecidable. 
The proof proceeds by embedding the classical theory of a reflexive 
and symmetric relation into the modal theory W-Th' through the 
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definition of the relation as O(Ew ^ Ev). (The undecidability of the 
theory of a reflexive and symmetric relation is established in Rogers [34] 
and the technique for reducing the modal theory to this case derives 
from Kripke [17] and Slomson [38].) 
The theory W-Th ° is, of course, merely the pure modal theory of 
identity. Thus the undecidability result for this theory stands in 
contrast to the classical case; for there, as follows from earlier 
observations or from Ackerrnann ([1], Chapter 3), the pure theory of 
identity is decidable. 
4. A P P L I E D  W O R L D  T H E O R I E S  
All of the world theories considered in §3 were pure; they contained 
no extra-logical vocabulary. But we may also consider applied world 
theories, obtained from a given theory by adding a standard world 
component. Let T be the given theory, with language H. Then the 
world expansion T ÷ o[ T is defined as follows. The language H + of T + 
is a two-sorted one, consisting of the individual variables x,, x2, . . ,  of 
H, the new world variables wl, w2 . . . .  , and the predicates of H. In the 
formation rules it is stipulated that the non-logical predicates of H 
only apply to individual variables. However, the existence- and iden- 
tity-predicates may apply indiscriminately to either sort of variable. 
The logical axioms of T + are like those of the one-sorted theories, but 
with the appropriate sortal restrictions. The non-logical axioms of T + 
are those of T (in the individual variables), those of W-Th (in the 
world variables), and all instances of the World Completeness 
scheme. Note that the instances will come from the expanded lan- 
guage H*. By our earlier remark, the scheme will be equivalent to 
those of its instances in which ~b is an atomic formula of the original 
language H. Thus if T is finitely axiomatized and has a finite language, 
then the same will be true of T +. 
Various extensions to T + can be given. In case the language H is 
finite, one may make the important assumption that H is capable of 
differentiating between distinct worlds. Suppose, for example, that H 
consists of a one-place predicate P and a two-place predicate R. Then 
the Differentiation Assumption would take the form: 
[]Vwl--]Vv(w~ v D © 3 x ( > 3 y [ - ( [ ] ( E w  D Px)  
- [--](Ev D Px)) v - ( [ ] ( E w  D Rxy)  - ~ ( E v  D Rxy))]. 
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One may also make various assumptions about  the identity or dis- 
tinctness of worlds and individuals. It may be assumed, for example,  
that the two are disjoint (F-1Vw[]Vx(w:~ x)) or that the worlds are 
among the individuals (F-1Vw'O3x(w = x)), in which case the previous 
Differentiation Assumption would be a consequence.  
The world-expansion T + bears an intimate connect ion to the clas- 
sical two-sorted analogue T ~s of T. Indeed,  the interest of the world- 
expansion largely derived from its being a modal intermediary be- 
tween the or thodox model theory T and the fully classical theory 
T is. The language 5¢ ~ may be defined as was 5g ~ in the last subsection 
(Class ical  A n a l o g u e s )  of §5 of [11], with the single except ion that 
identity may now be flanked by any two variables. For convenience,  
we shall use the same symbols for  world- and individual-variables in 
£g~ as in ~?+. There  is a standard translation, described in [11], of 
each formula 6 of 5¢ into a formula 6 ~ of 5f t~. The non-logical axioms 
of  T ~ are then simply the translates 4 /  of the non-logical axioms 6 
of T. 
There are extensions to the theory T is, analogous to those con- 
sidered for  the theory T +, that need not be separately considered. 
As one would expect ,  the theories T + and T s~ are mutually inter- 
pretable. The translation of 2g + into 2g ~ is obtained from the trans- 
lation of ~ into Sg ~ (given in [11]) by adding the clauses: 
(i) (Ev)w = w = v 
(ii) (s = t)w = s = t, for  s and t any variables; 
(iii) (Vv6)w = (6)~ 
On the other hand, the translation of Sg ts into 5e + is defined with the 
help of the following clauses: 
(i) ( R * w x ~ . . .  x , )  + = V-I(Ew D R x l . . .  x , )  
(ii) ( E * w x )  + = ~ ( E w  ~ E x )  
(iii) (s = t) += s = t 
(iv) ( -  6 )  + = - ( 6 )  + 
(v) ( (6 v ¢ ) ) + =  ( (6)  + v (~0) +) 
(vi) (Vx6)  + = [ ]Vx[ i ] (6)  + 
(vii) ( q w 6 )  + = [Z]qwVl(6) + 
Suppose that to is the actual world constant  in ~ts (formerly called 
w~). Then the translate (6)  + ~ a sentence 6 of ~I ,  containing to is 
3 w ( 6 ( w ) )  +, where 6(w)  is the resuR of substituting a new world 
variable w for to in 6. 
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It may now be shown that: 
THEOREM 8 (i) For any sentence ~b of 5f +, T+k~b implies Tf~k,b ~ and 
T+Fb = (6~)+; 
(ii) for any sentence ~b of ~f~, Ty*F& implies T+k(~b) + and Tf*F& - 
(~)+'. 
Proof. Either semantically, using the natural correspondence be- 
tween the classical models of T rs and the differentiated models of T +, 
or else syntactically. 
The result may be extended to the various strengthenings of T + and 
T f~ in the obvious way. 
In regard to the provability within T + of ~b = (~b~) +, we may note 
that the combined translation ((~b)w) + provides a modelling of the 
possible worlds semantics within T + of the sort depicted in corollary 
7 of Fine [16]. Indeed, part of the value of the theorem is that it 
allows one to simplify the proof that the classical theory T ss is 
interpretable within T by establishing interpretability for the modal 
theory T +, that is so much closer in form to T. 
Usually, the classical theory T # or, equivalently, the world expan- 
sion T + will have greater expressive power than the original modal 
theory T. Therefore considerable interest attaches to positive results 
which establish the interpretability within T of its own semantics T f~ 
and to negative results which show that T and T ss are far apart. 
On the positive side, we have the interpretability results of [15] and 
[16]. However,  such results need to be stated with great care. For in 
the earlier interpretations, the individuals of T + were identified with 
themselves, and the worlds of T + with a restricted class of the 
individuals. In effect, each formula ~b of 5f + was translated into a 
formula t# ° of 5¢ by replacing each subformula Ew of ~b with Ww and 
each subformula Vwg, of ~b with the relativization Vx(Wx ~ ~) 
(changing variables to avoid conflict). Now although it may be true, 
for suitable Wx, that: 
(i) if T+F& then TF4~°; 
it will not in this case also be true that: 
(ii) if TF~b ° then T+k&; 
unless T and hence T + are inconsistent. For let qb be the differen- 
tiation-type formula VqV vl--lV w[ ~(  Ew A -El)) 
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3x(E](Ew D Wx) v -E](Ev D Wx))]. Then as long as the one direction 
(i) of the interpretability result is provable, $0 will be a theorem of T, 
since it will follow by letting " x "  be the world "w" .  On the other 
hand, ~b itself will not be a theorem of T ÷, unless T is inconsistent; 
for otherwise there will be a model ~ for T, and therefore a model ~02 ÷ 
for T ÷ and - $ ,  obtained by associating distinct worlds with a given 
individual structure 92w of 9)2. 
The best that can be established for the previous translation is the 
following: 
THEOREM 9. Suppose that T satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) of 
lemma 4.4 of [16], i.e. there is a formula Wx of T with one free 
variable x such that T proves [-33xWx and ([])[(Wx ^ ~b)D 
7q(Wx D ~b)], for ~b any atomic formula of ~ not containing x. Let  ~b 
be any sentence of ~f÷ in which each atomic subformula containing a 
world-variable occurs in the context ~3(Ew D ~b), for ~ an atomic 
formula of ~.  Then: 
(i) T+~-$ iff T~-4~°; 
(ii) T%~b -- ~b °. 
Proof. Semantically in terms of the obvious correspondence be- 
tween the worlds and the individuals satisfying Wx in any model of 
T +" 
Although the restriction on ~b may seem rather strange, it cor- 
responds, in Sg s, to the natural condition that no world-variables 
should flank identity. Thus, as should be expected, the translation ~b ° 
only preserves the truths and falsehoods of the semantical meta- 
theory in so far as they do not concern the identity of worlds. 
This restriction on ~b is not really acceptable, since it means that 
certain questions from ~g~ may be improperly answered in T. One 
would like, first of all, to allow atomic subformulas Ew to occur in th 
or, equivalently, identities between world-variables) 7 There are then 
various ways in which the interpretability of T + within T might still 
be established. One possibility is to change the nature of the trans- 
lation, so that the individuals of T + are now associated with a 
subclass of the individuals of T;  but in the nature of the case it would 
be difficult to do this in such a way as to secure exact interpretability. 
Another possibility is to add new axioms to T ÷. In case the language 
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2? + is finite, we may add the Differentiation Assumption as an axiom 
to T +. Theorem 8 can then be proved without restriction on &, as long 
as T also proves (E3)[(>(Wx ^ W y ) D x  = y] or as long as, in the 
translation 4~ °, the identities w = v are replaced with [-](Wx - W y ) .  
Whether such additions to T ÷ are legitimate depends upon the 
theory under consideration. The question is: does the vocabulary of 
T enable us to distinguish between what, intuitively, are distinct 
possible worlds? In the case of modal set theory, it does not; for 
distinct worlds may have the same sets. In the case of modal 
proposition theory, though, it does; since any two worlds will differ in 
their true propositions. Thus although the reductions of the world- 
based theories to the modal theories are on a formal par for sets and 
propositions, there is an important intuitive distinction between the 
two. For the set-theoretic reduction requires us to conflate intuitively 
distinct worlds, whereas the propositional reduction does not. Al- 
though such a difference does not matter for reductions from a 
restricted language, it does matter for extensions of the reduction in 
which the identity of worlds can explicitly be discussed. 
In addition to identities between world-variables, we should allow 
identities between world- and individual-variables within the scope of 
our reduction. But then further problems arise. For let 4~ be the 
sentence V w 3 x ( w  = x) .  Then on the standard reductions, ~b ° will be a 
theorem of T and yet,  unless T is inconsistent, ~b will not be a 
theorem of T. Again, this difficulty may be removed either by chang- 
ing the nature of the translation, which would appear to be difficult, or 
by adding the Inclusion Assumption V w 3 x ( w  = x )  to T*o And again, 
whether this is legitimate depends upon whether worlds are, in- 
tuitively, individuals of the given theory T. For the modal theories of 
propositions and sets, they are not. But for the modal theory of facts, 
they are. Thus we see that the latter theory has a big advantage over 
the others; it allows a reduction of the full classical theory of worlds, 
with no bars on the expressible identities. If the other theories also 
permit a full reduction, it is not in any straightforward way. 
In theorem 8 and its envisaged extensions, I have considered a very 
simple and particular reduction, ~b °, from T ÷ to T; and it is therefore 
natural to wonder if there are essentially different ways in which a 
reduction might be achieved. One natural idea is to expand on the 
number of variables associated with the formula Wx.  So let us 
suppose that with each world-variable w are associated new and 
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distinct individual-variables xl, xz; . . . .  x,, with no single individuable- 
variable associated in this way with two distinct world-variables. Let  
X(xl,  x2 . . . . .  x , )  be a particular formula in the free variables 
x~, x2 . . . . .  x,. Now set up a translation +1 from ~+ to ~ in the usual 
way, but  with E w  being replaced by X(xl,  x2 . . . . .  x , )  and Vwto being 
replaced by  V x l x : .  . . x , ( x ( x l ,  xz . . . . .  x , )  D ~ ) ,  Such a translation ~b ~ 
might be called standard.  Then it can be shown that ~b I is a reduction, 
satisfying (i) and (ii) of theorem 9, as long as T proves 
[ ] 3 x l x 2 . . . x , x ( x l ,  x2 . . . . .  x , )  and (O)[X(xl, x2 . . . . .  x,) ^ ~b D 
[](X(x~, x2 . . . . .  x , )  D 4~)], for all atomic cO not containing x~, xz . . . . .  x,. 
It may also shown that, for each n = 2, 3 . . . . .  there is a theory T, 
that admits a standard reduction for a formula X(xl, x2 . . . . .  x,) of n 
free variables, but  not for a formula of fewer  free variables. To 
illustrate how the .construction T, goes, let Tz be the theory with no 
non-logical constants and with non-logical axioms [ ] 3 x 3 y ( x ~  y ^ 
V z ( z  = x v z = y)) and [-3VxTqVy(x~ y D ~ ( E x  ^ Ey)). Then Tz per- 
mits a standard reduction of T~ with X(Xt, xz) as xl ~ x2 ^ Exl  ^ Ex2. 
But since any permutat ion on the individuals of a model ~Y~ of Tz 
induces an automorphism on 9Y~, it may be shown that no reduction 
can be effected with a single free-variable formula in place of 
X(Xl, x2). The result for  T2 is of some philosophical interest,  since it 
indicates how a reduction from T + to T might be achieved without 
there being a definable proxy function. 
Are there any other reductions of T+? One might consider a 
translation in which each subformula VwtO was replaced by a fixed 
and elementarily definable function of tO (I need not be exact  about 
details). I would then conjecture,  though with not much confidence, 
that any theory that permitted a reduction of this more general sort 
also permit ted a standard reduction. 
Le t  us now consider the negative question of how far short the 
modal theory T may fall f rom its classical counterpart  T S. Cor- 
responding to the different restrictions on 5¢ + are three different 
classical theories: T'% with no world-variables flanking identities; T s, 
with no world- and individual-variable flanking an identity; T j', with 
no restriction on identities. The successive gaps between T and T~% 
T " and T% and T ~ and T s~ may then be considered. 
In regard to completeness,  it should be clear that the olae theory 
can be complete when its successor  is not,  because of the difference 
in expressive power.  The only case that would seem to cause any 
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difficulty is that of T and TrL To deal with this case, we may modify 
an example given in the proof  of theorem 3.2 of [12]. Le t  T be the 
modal theory with no non-logical predicates and with axioms: 
Bx~Bx2.  . . 3x~ A x~:~ x;; 
l<_i<j<--n 
[ ]Vx  0 - E x ;  and 
( [ ] ) ( - E x  ^ - E y )  D x = y]. 
Then: 
T H E O R E M  10. The theory T is complete,  although the theory T r~ is 
not. 
P r o o f .  Let  9~ and ~ be any structures for  T. Then it may be shown 
by a simple induction on ~b that: 
If (a) ei = ei iff  fi = fi and (b) ei ~ -4w iff fi E / ~  for i, j = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, 
then (9~, w ) ~ c h [ e l  . . . . .  e,] iff (~ ,  v ) ~ 4 ~ [ f ~  . . . . .  f~]. 
Since any two models of T are elementarily equivalent, T is complete.  
Now let 9~=(W, .4 )  be the structure in which W = { 0 ,  1 . . . .  }, 
A = {1, 2 . . . .  } and fi,, = A - {n} for n = 0, 1 . . . .  ; let ~ be the restric- 
tion of 9~ to V = {1, 2 . . . .  }; and let ~b be the sentence 3 w V x E * w x  of 
2grL Then 9~ and ~ are both models for  T. But ~b is true in ~ but not 
in 9~, and therefore  6 goes undecided in T. 
More interesting than completeness is the gap in decidability bet- 
ween two theories. The most  important  case is that in which the 
modal theory T is decidable but the weaker  classical theory T rs is 
not. Let  T be the pure theory whose non-logical axioms are: 




D O ( E x l  A " ' "  ^ Ex , ,  A -Ex, ,+~ A " "  A - E x , ) ] ,  for all 
m , n  = 1,2 . . . .  and m -<n. 
Then: 
T H E O R E M  11. T is decidable, while T r~ is not. 
Proo f .  We show that T is decidable by showing that it is complete.  
To this end, it suffices to show that any two models 932 and 92 of T are 
elementarily equivalent. But, as with the proof  of theorem 10, we may 
show by a simple induction on ~b(xl, x2 . . . . .  x,) that: 
86 KIT F I N E  
(1) Suppose that ~r~ = (9~, w) and 92 = (c~, v) are models of T, and that 
e~, e2 . . . . .  e, and f~,f2 . . . . .  f ,  are elements of A and B respectively 
such that (a) e i=e j  iff [ i = f i  and (b) e ~ A ~  iff [~E/3~ for all 
i, j = 1, 2 . . . . .  n. Then: 
(9/, w)~6[e l ,  e2 . . . . .  e,] iff 
(9~, w ) ~ 6 [ f l ,  f 2 . . . . .  f,]. 
The required result on elementary equivalence now follows. 
The classical theory T c of a partial ordering R is undecidable (see 
Tarski [42]). We show that T is undecidable by interpreting T c within 
T r'. Set a world-variable w0 aside. Translate each formula 6 of T c 
into a formula 6 '  of T ~s by replacing each atomic subformula Rxixj 
with Vx(E*w~x D E*w~x) and each quantified subformula VxiO with 
Vwi(Vx(E*wox D E*wix) ^ -Vx(E*wix D E*wox) D qJ'), for i, j = 
1, 2 . . . . .  It may now be shown that: 
(2) for each sentence 6 of ~¢, T ~ - 6  iff T~-Vwo6'. 
The difficult part of the proof is from right to left. So suppose T ~ ~ 6. 
Then for some model ~1~= (A, r) of T ~ (where r gives the extension of 
R), ~ 0 ~  6. Define a model 92 = (W, B, e*) of 5f r' (where e* gives the 
extension of E*), by letting: 
B = A U Co, for Co some infinite set disjoint from A; 
W = {Co U {b : (b, a) ~ r} : a ~ A} U {C _C A : C is infinite, yet  C f3 Co 
is finite}; 
e* = { ( w , b ) ~  W × B : b ~ W}. 
Clearly, "0 is a model for T'. Now let f be the map from A into W 
for which: 
f(a) = Co U {b : <b, a) ~ r}. 
Then f is an isomorphic embedding of (A, r) into (W, C ), from which 
it readily follows that 92 ~=VWo6'. 
To take care of the gap between T '~ and T ~, let T be the previously 
considered pure theory with axioms []!3x3y(x~ y t, 
Vz(z = x v z = y)) and ~VxF'lVy(x ~ y D ~(Ex ^ Ey)). 
THEOREM 12. T"  is decidable, but T '  is not. 
Proof. To show that T r" is decidable, associate with each world- 
variable wi a pair xi, yi of distinct individual-variables. Translate each 
formula ~b of T r' into another formula 6 '  of T '~ by replacing each 
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atomic subformula E*wgx with x = xg v x = yi and each quantified 
subformula Vwito with Vx~, y~(x~e y~ D tO'). Then it may be shown that: 
(1) for  each sentence ~b of 5f r~, T ~ b  iff 3 x 3 y ( x ¢ y ) D 4 ~ '  is a 
theorem of the pure classical theory T I of identity. 
The decidability of T rs then follows from the decidability of T I. 
To show that T '  is undecidable, we may embed the classical theory 
of a symmetric and irreflexive relation into T ~. The essential idea of 
the proof is to define the relation Rxy  by x ¢  y A 
3 W 3 V ( W ¢  V A E * w x  A E * w y  ^ E * v x  A E*vy) .  
Finally, the gap between T ' and T f' can be handled by means of 
the modal theory T of pairs of individuals. T contains one non-logical 
predicate R of degree 3. Le t  P x ( x  is a pair) abbreviate 3y, z(y, zRx)  
and Ix(x  is an individual) abbreviate - Px. The non-logical axioms of 
T are ~Vx[S]3x, ff]VxVy (Ix ^ Iy D 3!z(x ,  yRz)),  
VqVx, y, z, s, t(x, yRz  ^ s, tRz D x E s ^ y = t), ~ V x ( P x  D 
- 3y,  z(x, yRz  ^ y, xRz)) ,  ~ V x ,  y, z(x, yRz  C [2x, yRz).  
T H E O R E M  13. T s is decidable and T Is undecidable. 
Proof. The theory T s can be reduced to the pure classical two- 
sorted theory of identity by interpreting quantification Vx(Px  D . . .  ) 
over  pairs as multiple quantification VxVy . . . .  The theory T # is 
undecidable since the classical theory of an arbitrary two-place rela- 
tion S dan be interpreted with T ~ upon defining Sxy as 3 w 3 z ( w  = 
z ^ Pz  A X, yRz).  
5. A N T I - O B J E C T U A L I S T  F A C T S  
This section gives an account  of fact  theories under the anti-objec- 
tualist approach. We begin with truths and follow with circumstances.  
To a large extent,  our t reatment  will parallel that in §2 of [15] for  
propositions; and so, for  that reason, we may be brief. 
The structures for  A s will be of the form (W,/~), where W (worlds) 
is a non-empty set and Fw (facts of W) is a set for  each w ~ W, with 
F = LJ w~w/~w non-empty.  Structures of this sort will be called f ac t  
structures, or F-structures for  short. Recall that it is our intention 
that the variables range over  the actual, not the possible, facts of each 
world; and so we should not expect  if" to be a constant  function. 
It will be helpful to appropriate some of the terminology for  
existence-sets from §1 of [15]. Accordingly, given a structure 2~ = 
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(W, F) ,  a world w in W, an element f of F, and a subset G of F, let: 
esf f )  = (w w:fEPw}; 
es (G)  = {w E W : g ~ Fw for  all g E G } =  ~ g ~  es(g);  
ESw = {es(e):  e ~ Pw}; 
E S  = U wew ESw = {es(e)  : e ~ F}.  
When necessary,  the given structure ~3 may be indicated by  a super- 
script. 
When an anti-objectualist stance is combined with (a) a conception 
of facts as derivative, (b) an empirical criterion for their identity, and 
(c) a Platonic attitude towards propositions, as in §2 of [15], we are 
led to the following two conditions, F(A)-Cond,  on a model 92 = 
w): 
(i) Pla ton ism:  for  each non-empty V _C W, there is an f ~ F such 
that es ( f )  = V;  
(ii) Empir ical  Identi ty:  e s ( f )  = es (g)  implies f = g for all f, g.~ F. 
In order to facilitate the formulat ion of the theory for the two 
conditions, we shall use the following two abbreviations: 
e ~ ef for  [](Ee - E l ) ;  
W e  for  V f ~ ( E e  D El ) .  
According to the first, e and f have the same existence conditions; 
and according to the second, e is a world fact ,  one whose existence 
requires the existence of all other  (actual) facts. The axioms of the 
theory F(A)-Th are then: 
Naive  Abs t rac t ion:  ([-q)[05 D ~ff-q(Ef  - 05)1, where 05 is any formula 
and f is a variable not  free in 05. 
Empir ical  Ident i ty:  (t--1)(e ~- ef ~ e = f ) .  
World  Fact:  l--IBfWf. 
Naive Abstraction says that (necessarily) to each sentence there 
corresponds a fact  whose existence conditions are the truth con- 
ditions of the sentence. Empirical Identity says that facts with the 
same empirical content  are the same. And World Fact  says that 
necessarily there is a world fact. 
As the axioms have been stated, there is a necessary fact,  one that 
necessarily exists. Without much difference to the formal develop- 
ment, the existence of a necessary fact  could either be left open or 
else excluded. In the first case, the correspondence axiom should 
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assume the form: 
([~)[(~b A 0 -- ~b) D :::]f[](Ef =- ~b)]; 
and in the second case, the axiom: 
- 0 3 I ~ E y  
should also be added. For the most part, though, I shall follow the 
simpler course of postulating a necessary fact. 
Let  us relabel the anti-objectualist propositional theory MC in §2 of 
[15], P(A)-Th. Recall that this theory is complete for the conditions, 
which we may now label P(A)-Cond: 
Constant Domain: For any e E P, es(e) = W;  
Empirical Identity: ts(e) = ts(f)  ~ e = f ;  
Platonism : For each V C_ W, V ~ TS ~. 
Between the anti-objectualist theories F(A)-Th and P(A)-Th, for 
propositions and facts, there is a rather obvious correspondence. For, 
in the one direction, we may identify facts with true propositions and, 
in the other direction, we may identify propositions with possible 
facts. With the latter identification, there are some difficulties, though; 
for, first, there are impossible propositions, but no impossible facts, 
and, second, there is only actual quantification over facts, but pos- 
sibilist quantification over propositions. However,  there are technical 
tricks for removing these difficulties. 
The correspondence has both a semantical and a syntactical side. 
Recall from [15], that a propositional or P-structure 91 for the 
language ~v is a triple (W, P, t), where W(worlds) is a non-empty set, 
l~w(propositions), for each w ~ W, is a set, with P = kJ ~W/Sw non- 
empty, and t(truth) is a subset of W x P. On the semantical side, we 
may first associate with each P-structure 91 = (W, P, t) an F-structure 
9~ s = (W f, F) ,  for which: 
(i) W I = W; and 
(ii) Fw = {e~Pw :(w, e> ~ t}. 
Conversely, with each F-structure ~3 = (W, F) ,  we may associate a 
P-structure ~3 p = (W p,/5, t) for which: 
(i) W p = W; 
(ii) /sw = F U { ̂  }, for each w E IV, with ^ an element foreign 
to F ;  and 
(iii) t = {(w, e>eW x P : e ~ F~,}. 
90 KIT F I N E  
The first transformation in effect identifies each fact with a true 
proposition, and the second transformation in effect associates each 
proposition, the impossible one excepted, with a possible fact. 
Note that (~3~) s=  ~3 for any F-structure ~ and that (9Is) p is 
isomorphic to 91 for any P-structure subject to P(A)-Cond. 
Each transformation of structures is matched by a translation of 
languages, though in the opposite direction. In going from S to ~P, 
the translate t) ~ of any formula O of 2g s is obtained, first by replacing 
each atomic sub-occurrence Eli with T+pi, and then by replacing each 
subformula Vfi¢ with Vpi(Tpi D t)). Recall from [15], §8, that T+p 
abbreviates the expression TO ^ Ep for inner truth. In the anti- 
objectualist theories, T+p and TO are equivalent; but the use of T+O 
in the translation will later be important for the objectualist 
theories, 
The transition from ~fP to ~s is more complicated. It will be 
helpful to suppose that the language ~fP is enriched with an 
individual constant A (for the impossible proposition). Call the new 
language ~P'^. Recall that IIf~b (for the possibilist quantifier) ab- 
breviates ::Ig~-IVfI-q(Eg ~ 40, where g is a variable distinct from f and 
not free in 6. Then the translate q5 s of a formula ~ of ~P'~- is obtained, 
first by replacing each sub-formula Vo~qJ(p~) with IIf~¢(p~) A ¢( _A ), and 
then by making the following replacements for atomic sub-occur- 
rences: 
7- for EOi or E ^ ; 
Eli for Tpl; 
± for T ^ ; 
± f o r  ^ = ^ ; a n d  
± f o r  ^ =p~orp~= ^. 
The relationship between the transformations and the translations 
is given by the following results: 
LEMMA 14. Let 91 be any P-structure, Sl, f2  . . . . .  fn individuals from 
912[ I, and qJ(fl, f z , . . . , f , )  any formula of 5f f with free variables 
fl, f2 . . . . .  f,. Then: 
(91s, w ) ~  qs[f,, f2 . . . . .  f . ]  i f f  (91, w ) ~  ~sP[f,. f2 . . . . .  f,,]; 
LEMMA 15. Let ~ be any F-structure, e~, e2 . . . . .  e, individuals from 
~P, and ~5(p~, 02,- . . ,  p,) any formula of the expanded language ~fP'^ 
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with free variables p~, 02,, • •, P.- Then: 
(~3 p, w ) ~  4~[eb e: . . . . .  e,] iff (~3, w)~  4~I[el, e2 . . . . .  e°]. 
The proofs are by a straightforward induction on the complexity of 
the formula ~b or ~. 
On the syntactic side, we have that the different translations 
preserve provability in the respective theories: 
THEOREM 16. The theories P(A)-Th and F(A)-Th are equivalent in 
the sense that for each sentence q~ of ~P and tO of ~fs: 
(i) P (A)-Th ~- ~h ~ F(A)-Th ~- 6~; 
(ii) F(A)-Th }- qJ f f  P (A)-Th ~ qJP; and 
(iii) P (A)-Th ~- ~b ---- (~br) p and F(A)-Th }-- 0 ~ (0p)t. 
Proof. By a simple induction either on the length of proofs or the 
complexity of formulas (noting that some of the clauses (i)-(iii) are 
redundant). 
One aspect of these translations may be regarded in a more general 
light. Let T be any arbitrary theory. Let P be a one-place predicate 
not in the language 5f of T, and let ~P be the result of adding the 
predicate P to 5f. Finally, let 4~ P, for 4~ a formula of ~g, be the result 
of relativizing the quantifiers to P and of replacing each occurrence 
of Ex in ~b with Px, and let T P be the theory with language ~P, whose 
axioms are []'¢x[]Ex, [~Vx~Px and all translates ~b P of axioms 4~ of 
T. Then it may be shown that, for each sentence ~b of Sg, T ~-~ iff 
T e ~-4~ P. Thus the translation ~b e gives an embedding of an arbitrary 
theory T into a theory T e with the formula []Vx[]Ex for constant 
domain. 
If we now think of truth T as the special predicate P, then the 
above construction gives an embedding of the fact theory F(A)-Th 
into the theory of possible propositions. From this, the theory of all 
propositions may be obtained by making explicit allowance for the 
impossible proposition. 
Standard meta-theorems may be established for F(A)-Th. From the 
above results and Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3 of [15] we obtain: 
COROLLARY 17. The theory F(A)-Th is sound and complete for the 
conditions F(A)-Cond; 
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COROLLARY 18. Le t  Inf be the sentences ©3fEf,  
0 3 f O 3 g ( [ ~ g )  . . . . .  Then the theory that results f rom adding 
those sentences as axioms to F(A)-Th  is negation-complete,  i.e. 
contains either ~b or -~b as a theorem for each sentence ~b of f .  
It may also be shown that: 
T H E O R E M  19. The axioms of F(A)-Th  are independent.  
Proof. Use the relevant  portions of theorem 33 of [15]. 
Similar results may be established for anti-objectualist theories of 
facts and propositions, with or without a relation of correspondence.  
It may be supposed that the structures for  5¢ p'i, the PF-structures, are 
of the form ( W , P , F , t ) ,  where W(worlds) is a non-empty set, 
/Sw(propositions) and Pw(propositions) are sets, with P = U ~ w  Pw 
and F = U w~w P~ non-empty,  and t(truth) is a subset of W x P. The 
domains 15 will be used to interpret  the predicate _P, so that: w~P_e 
iff e ~ P. Clearly, structures of this kind will be equivalent to struc- 
tures of the more or thodox kind, containing combined d o m a i n s / 5  U 
P~ for propositions and facts and a separate valuation for the predi- 
cate _P. 
With each PF-s t ruc ture  ~ = (W, P, F, t) may be associated the 
P-s t ructure  ~P = (W,/5, t) and the F-s t ructure  ~ = (W, F).  Let  us 
establish a notation for the inner truth-sets of P-s t ructures  and their 
extensions by setting: 
its(e) = ts(e) n es(e); 
ITSw = {its(e) : e E P~} 
1TS = {its(e) : e E P}. 
Then the following conditions may be imposed upon a PF-s t ruc ture  
P (A)-Adequacy ~ p satisfies P(A)-Cond;  
F(A)-Adequacy: cot satisfies F(A)-Cond;  
£F-Correspondence: There is a one-one correspondence 3~ between 
{e E P :its (e) :~ 4~} and F for which es(3,(e)) = its(e) whenever  e E 
domain (~); 
Distinctness: e E P  & f E F  ~ e ~  f; 
Nontruth: (w, e)E t ~ e E P. 
The correspondence condition states that there is a one-one cor- 
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respondence between propositions with non-empty inner truth-set and 
facts with identical existence-set. This correspondence will be unique 
under the empirical criteria of identity for facts and propositions, and, 
given that it exists, the condition of F-adequacy will be a con- 
sequence of P-adequacy. The conditions of Distinctness and Non- 
truth state, respectively, that propositions and facts are distinct and 
that facts are never true. The various justifications for these con- 
ditions have already been given and need not further be discussed. 
Let us call the set of these conditions PF(A)-Cond. Then the 
natural theory PF(A)-Th for these conditions will have axioms that 
divide into three parts: 
(i) the propositional axioms from P (A)-Th, with variables relativized 
to P ;  
(ii) the factual axioms from F(A)-Th, with variables relativized to 
F ;  
(iii) the mixing axioms: 
P-Rigidity: []Vx(Px D [~Px) 
Nontruth : (V1)- Tf  
Distinctness : ([])-(p = f). 
However, we should allow, in the abstraction schemes for pro- 
positions and facts, that the formulas range over those from the full 
language 5¢ p's and not merely from the respective languages ~ and 
S£ j. 
To some extent, the above axioms can be simplified. In the 
presence of Naive P-Abstraction, Naive F-Abstraction can be 
replaced by the correspondence thesis: 
PF-Correspondence: [--]Vp(T O D 3 f ~ ( E f  =- T+p)). 
For arguing intuitively, each q~ will yield an appropriate P, which, by 
the above principle, will then yield an appropriate f. Conversely, in 
the presence of Naive F-Abstraction, Naive P-Abstraction may be 
replaced by: 
FP-Correspondence: ~Vf3pD(T+p =- El); and 
Impossible Proposition: 3pl-7- Tp. 
Also, World Fact may be dropped, for PF- and FP-Correspondence 
will give a world fact for any world proposition. 
In a way, the present theory of facts and propositions is not 
significantly different from the previous theory of propositions; for 
the part that concerns facts merely duplicates one aspect of the part 
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that concerns propositions. We may, in fact, show that the two 
theories are mutually interpretable. On the semantic side, we may 
associate with each PF-structure  ~ the P-structure q~P, and with each 
P-structure 92 the PF-structure  920,I, obtained by combining 92 with a 
copy of 92~ in which the facts F are disjoint from the propositions P. It 
may then be shown that U p satisfies P(A)-Cond if ~ satisfies PF(A)- 
Cond and that each ~ satisfying PF(A)-Cond is of the form 92p,I for 
some 92 satisfying P(A)-Cond. 
The translation too from 2g ~ to 5f p'r is readily given. For too may be 
obtained from tO by replacing quantification Vpx(e) over propositions 
with the relativization Vx(Px ~ X(X)). The translation from 2? p'i to ~£P 
is a little more complicated. It will not do simply to identify facts with 
true propositions, as in the previous reduction of a purely factual 
language. For our theory is one in which the propositions and facts 
are assumed to be distinct and so, for the reasons given in §2, the 
theory will not admit of any kind of proxy reduction. 
However,  the only problem with a proxy reduction arises from the 
presence of identities between facts and propositions, and so an 
alternative form of reduction may be given by eliminating the iden- 
tities prior to applying the standard reduction. To be exact, in each 
formula ~b of 5¢ o'i, we may first replace each subformula VxtO with 
Vx(Px D tO) ^ Vx(Fx ~ tO) to obtain the formula 4~'. Clearly: 
(1) & =- tk' is logically valid. 
Now suppose that all of the variables of 5f p'¢ come from one of the 
two lists e~, e2 . . . .  and [~, [2,. • and that the e~'s are always relativized 
to propositions and the f~'s to facts. (This is also to apply to the bound 
variables that figure in the modal-quantifier prefix ([]).) Let  q5 ÷ be the 
result of replacing each occurrence of el = fj or fj = e~ in ~b' by ±. 
Then it is shown by an easy induction on 4) that: 
(2) (U])(tk' ---- ~b +) is a logical consequence of the axioms of PF- 
Distinctness and P-Rigidity. 
Finally, let q5 p be the result of identifying facts with true pro- 
positions. Thus Vpi(Ppi D tO) is replaced with VpitO, Vf~(F/, D ¢) with 
Vgi(T~+~ ~ tO) (for crl, g2 . . . .  new variables, distinct from fl, f2 . . . .  ), Eli 
with T+~q, and Pfi or Tfi with _L. In all essential respects, ~b p is an 
extension of the previous translation d~ p from ~ I  to ~P and hence the 
use of the same notation. 
It can now be shown that the theories P(A)-Th and PF(A)-Th are 
equivalent with respect to the translations ~b" and tOo: 
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THEOREM 20. For each sentence 0 of ~P and 4) of ~J:  
(i) P(A)-Th ~- q, ~ PF(A)-Th ~- 0°; 
(ii) PF(A)-Th~-  & ~ P(A)-Th~-~bP; and 
(iii) P(A)-Th~- t~ = (qJ~)P and PF(A)-Th~-  4) ~ (4~") °. 
A comparable result for models may also be established, but we 
will not give details. 
Part (iii) is established with the help of the following result, which 
will also be useful later. Let  us use 4) p'° for (&~)o. Then: 
L E M M A  21. For &'= d~'(pl . . . . .  Pro . f1  . . . . .  f , )  a formula of 5¢ p's with 
free variables among p~ . . . . .  p ~ , f ~ , . . . , f , ,  the sentence (~) 
n 
[ A  [~(Ef, =- r+(rj) D c~'(p, . . . . .  Pro, fl . . . .  , f . )  ~- 4)P'°(P, Pro, 
k ~  1"~ 
cr~ . . . . .  tr,)] is a logical consequence of Distinctness, P-Rigidity, 
Non-truth and PF-  and FP-Correspondence.  
Proof. By induction on ~. 
We may note that the lemma enables us to make a further sim- 
plification to the system PF(A)-Th.  For given the assumptions of the 
lemma as axioms, Naive P-Abstract ion may be restricted to the case 
in which the formula ~b belongs to 2C p. For when the formula is 
4/(Pb • • : ,  Pro, fJ . . . . .  f~), P-Abstraction applied to 
4)P(p~ . . . . .  Ore, o-t . . . . .  ~r~) will yield the desired proposition. 
From theorem 20 and the completeness of P(A)-Th, it is readily 
established that: 
THEOREM 22. The theory PF(A)-Th  is sound and complete for 
PF(A)-Cond.  
The theory and semantics for the language ~p.,,,c is essentially no 
different from that for the language 5fP'¢; for since the one-one 
correspondence postulated in the Correspondence Condition is 
unique, xCy may be given the definition Px ^ Fy ^ [](T+x =- Ey). In 
the objectualist systems to be considered later, the relation C will 
have independent interest and it will then be given more detailed 
attention. 
Let  us now consider an interpretation of the language 5f s in which 
the variables range over circumstances. In this case, it will not be 
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important to distinguish between the objectualist or anti-objectualist 
approaches, since neither will lead to any special requirements on the 
systems or their semantics. As before, the F-structures ~3 may be 
subject to the condition: 
Empirical Identity: es(f) = es(g) ~ f = g 
Given that circumstances are determinate, it is plausible to replace 
the Platonic condition with: 
Conjunctive Closure: If Vi ~ ES ~, i ~ I, and CI Vi is non-empty, 
then f3 Vi ~ ES ~. 
We allow that I be empty; so it follows, in particular, that 
W E ES ~. However, no other sets need belong to ES ~, and so it 
should be separately stated that there are world circumstances: 
World Fact: {w} E ES ~ for each w ~ W. 
Alternatively, in the presence of Conjunctive Closure, World Fact 
may be replaced by the condition that for distinct w, v E W there is a 
V ~ ES ~ for which v ~ V but v~  V. The two conditions together 
may be labelled C-Cond. 
On the syntactic side, the abstraction axiom may be replaced by 
two of its consequences. One is 
Determination: (Fq)[~b D 3f[](Ef  D ~b)]. 
In this axiom, the biconditional in comprehension is replaced by a 
conditional. The other consequence is an axiom of conjunctive 
closure. Following the definition of arbitrary conjunction in §5 of [15], 
let us put: 
g Conjr~b for Va[Wa D E3(Eg = (IIf[](Ea D d/) D E/))], 
Then the axiom takes the form: 
Conjunctive Closure: 3g(g Conjf0), for g a variable distinct from f 
and not free in q/. 
As with the case of propositions, it is important to distinguish 
between the general fact that V[0(f) and the conjunction of all facts 
satisfying t~(f). Thus in case ~k(_f) is the condition El, the general fact 
is the necessary circumstance that V[Ef, while the conjunction is a 
world-circumstance. 
The axiom of Determination may be replaced by a single one of its 
instances: 
Covering: I[]Vf~i(- Ef  D 3g(~Eg D -Ef)) .  
The axiom in its full generality may then be proved from World 
Fact by an easy induction. It v~ould be interesting to know if Con- 
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junctive Closure could be replaced by finitely many of its instances, 
since then the whole theory could be finitely axiomatized. 
The new theory is deprived of many of the consequences of 
Comprehension. It cannot be proved, for example, that the dis- 
junction of arbitrary facts is a fact (VqVfVg3hV](Eh -- (El v Eg))) or 
that the complement of a non-necessary fact is a fact (VqVf[](-Ef D 
3g~(Eg --= -El))). 
Let C-Th (circumstance theory) consist of the axioms of Empirical 
Identity, World Fact, Covering and Conjunctive Closure. Then the 
standard meta-theorems on soundness and independence may be 
established: 
THEOREM 23. The theorems of C-Th are true in the structures 
satisfying C-Cond. 
Proof. Straightforward. 
THEOREM 24. The four axioms of C-Th are independent. 
Proof. For Empirical Identity and World Fact, we may use the 
counter-models of theorem 19, with Abstraction replacing Closure. 
For Conjunctive Closure, one may use the structure ~ = (W,F) ,  
where W = {0, 1, 2, 3}, F = {{n}: n = 0, 1, 2, 3} U {{0, 1, 2}, {0, 1, 3}} and 
F,  = {V ~ F : n ~ V}. Let  g = {0, 1, 2} and h = {0, 1, 3}. Then ~ verifies 
the other axioms, but not ~ f ( f  Conj g,h). For Covering, let ~ = 
(W, F),  where W = {0, 1, 2 . . . .  }, F = {{m : m - n}: n ~ W} and /3m = 
{ V  E F : m ~ V}. Then cg verifies the other axioms, but not Covering. 
For let f = { 1 , 2  . . . .  }. Then ( ~ , O ) ~ - E f ,  but there is no g ~ P 0  for 
which ~ ~ [3(Eg ~ -El ) .  
In regard to the decision problem for C-Th, we have the surprising 
result that: 
THEOREM 25. The theory C-Th is undecidable. 
Proof. The theory of a reflexive symmetric relation is undecidable. 
But this theory may be embedded in C-Th. For given a sentence cb of 
the classical theory, let ~b* be the result of replacing each atomic 
formula Rxy in ~b by <>3g[](Eg = (Ee v E/)), each identity formula 
x = y  by e = f, and each individual quantifier Vx by nYeO(OWe 
. . . ) .  Then it may be shown that ~b is a theorem of the classical 
theory iff ~* is a theorem of C-Th. 
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Let C-Th* be the theory determined by the conditions C-Cond. 
Then for C-Th*, the situation is even worse. 
THEOREM 26. The theory C-Th* is non-axiomatizable. 
Proof. The second-order theory of a reflexive and symmetric rela- 
tion (with quantification over arbitrary sets) is non-axiomatizable. 
Indeed, it is equivalent in undecidability to full second-order logic. Now 
this theory may be embedded in C-Th* by modifying the previous 
translation. Set on one side a fact variable e0. Then the individual 
quantifier Vx now goes into E]VeU]((<>We ^ (e# e0)) D . . .  ), the mem- 
bership formula x E X is replaced by [](Ee ~ Ee'), and the set 
quantifier Vx by U]Vx'U]. Let ~b0 be the formula Weo ^ 
F-lVe((We ^ e~ co) ~ <>3f[q(Ef = -Ee)).  Then it may be shown that 
the classical sentence ~b is a theorem of the second-order theory iff its 
translate &0 D (b* is a theorem of C-Th*. (The antecedent ~0 is 
introduced in order to gain the effect of quantification over arbitrary sets 
of individuals.) 
Since identity is definable within C-Th*, we have here our first 
example of a pure existence theory that is of intuitive interest yet not 
axiomatizable. 
Many other theories under the anti-objectualist approach may be 
considered. For example, factual counterparts to the propositional 
systems PDC, PC* and PC of [15] may be set up, and comparable 
result proved. Or again, a relation of underlying or more explicitly 
structural devices may be introduced into either the theory of facts or 
of circumstances. However, I shall make no attempt to survey these 
various possibilities. 
6. O B J E C T U A L I S T  C O N D I T I O N S  ON F A C T S  
We shall consider the conditions appropriate for structures under an 
objectualist theory of truths. 
It will help to begin by reviewing and revising the objectualist 
conditions on propositional structures. Recall, from §3 of [15], that 
the three conditions of Diversity, World Actualism and Automor- 
phism were imposed upon a P-structure 91. We shall now impose a 
further condition on 91: 
Coincidence: For each non-empty U ~ ITS ~, (U, U ) E  M V  ~. 
Call a proposition e ~ P coincident if ts(e) = es(e). Then the above 
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condition provides a coincident proposition for each inner truth-set. 
We may use P-Cond to refer to all four conditions. 
As already explained in §2, the further condition will be justified if 
facts can appear as constituents in propositions and are subject to 
objectualist requirements; for given the proposition O with non-empty 
inner truth-set U, we may let the coincident proposition with modal 
value (U, U} be that the fact f, corresponding to e, exists. In the 
original conditions on P-structures,  this further condition was not con- 
templated, since it was supposed that all propositions were construc- 
tured by existentially transparent means. But this supposition must be 
dropped since it is allowed that facts can occur as constituents in 
propositions. 
Call a proposition t r a n s p a r e n t  if it is constructed by existentially 
transparent means alone; and otherwise call it opaque .  Then the 
previous conditions were adequate in their postulation of modal 
values for transparent propositions, as shown in the proof of theorem 
11 in [15]. It may now be wondered whether the new conditions are 
adequate in their postulation of modal values for all propositions or, 
more exactly, whether for each P-structure 9~ satisfying the con- 
ditions there is an underlying individual structure ~ that generates 
propositions with the same modal values as 96. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to be too specific about the opaque 
means available for constructing propositions in ~. Let  p = 
p(i l ,  i2 . . . .  ) be an arbitrary proposition with individual constituents 
il, i2 . . . . .  (The individual constituents may always be indicated in this 
manner.) Now: 
(1) the proposition P = p(i l ,  i2 . . . .  ) has the same truth-set as a 
transparent proposition p'(il ,  i2 . . . .  ) ;  
for the use of opaque constructions should make no difference to 
the truth-sets that are ultimately expressible in terms of certain 
individuals. Also: 
(2) the existence-set of p = p(il ,  i2 . . . .  ) is the truth-set of a trans- 
parent proposition cr = o'(it, i2,. • • ). 
Indeed, (2) follows from (1); for the existence-set of the proposition 
p = p(i l ,  i 2 , . . .  ) will be the truth-set of the proposition that p exists, 
which will then be the truth-set of a transparent proposition 
o ' ( i l ,  i2 . . . .  ). 
Let  U, V and V' be the sets of worlds for which the modal values 
of p, p' and o-, respectively, are (U, V), (U, V') and (V, V'}. Note that 
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V is non-empty and also that V _C V', since the existence of the 
individuals i~, i2 . . . .  is required for the existence of p. Given the 
adequacy of the original conditions, (U, V'), (V, V ' ) ~ M V  ~. So 
(V, V) E MV ~, by the coincidence condition. Therefore  (W, V) and 
(U, V)= (W A U, V N V ' )  are members of MV ~l by simple ap- 
plications of lemma 17 in [15]. 
Let  us now consider the objectualist conditions appropriate for 
F-s t ructures .  Each of the conditions of Diversity, World Actualism 
and Automorphism for P-s t ructures  will correspond to a condition on 
F-structures .  
Diversity now takes the form: 
Given any f ~ F, there are infinitely many g for which es(g) = es(f). 
The justification for the condition is simply this. Le t  p be a pro- 
position to which f corresponds.  Then, as argued in Section 2 of [15], 
there are infinitely many propositions with the same truth- and 
existence-sets as p. But given that facts inherit the identity conditions 
of the propositions to which they correspond,  there will be infinitely 
many facts with the same existence set as f. 
We may say that ~ = (W, F )  is an o~-structure if {e ~ F:es ( e )=  
es(f)} is always of cardinality w. Intuitively, this strengthening of 
Diversity is not justified; but  it will have certain technical uses. 
World Actualism is the same as before:  
~w = ~v implies ~ = ~ for all w, v ~ W. 
However ,  the application of the condition is now to the new type of 
structure. The justification is immediate;  for if two worlds are dis- 
tinct, there must be a fact  in one of the two worlds by which they are 
distinguished. Unless otherwise indicated, we shall assume that our 
structures are differentiated (~w = ~ implies w = v); so it will also be 
true that ~ = ~3~ implies w = v. 
The final condition is Automorphism. Recall the relevant 
definitions. The pair a = (a~,a2) is an automorphism on the F -  
structure ~ = (W, t ~) if: 
(i) ai and az are permutations on W and F respectively,  
(ii) e ~ P~ if[ az(e) ~ P~,(~) for  all e ~ F and w E W. 
(The conditionals in the definition of [15] should, of course, have been 
biconditionals.) Given the F-s t ructure  ~ = (W, F) ,  the automorphism 
a = (~1, a2) on ~ is fixed on G C_ F ff a2(.f) = f for  all f ~ G, and the 
subset G of F determines the subset V of W if a~[V] = V whenever  
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the automorphism a = (al, Or2) is fixed on G. Automorphism now 
takes the form: 
If the subset of F determines V C_ W and e s ( G ) n  V ~  ~, then 
es(G) ~ V ~ ES ~. 
The justification for the condition is roughly this. Given that G 
determines V, there is a proposition constructed from the elements of 
G by purely transparent means whose truth-set is V. The cor- 
responding fact will then have existence set es(G) N V, assuming that 
the set is non-empty. The reader should consult [15] for further 
elaboration on this type of argument. 
The above three conditions are the natural counterparts to the 
original conditions on P-structures. Moreover, there is no natural 
counterpart to the coincidence conditions, since there is no analogue 
to the distinction between truth- and existence-sets for facts. It 
therefore seems reasonable that the factual conditions should give the 
exact meaning of the propositional conditions for factual structures 
or, more exactly, that an F-structure ~ should satisfy the factual 
conditions iff it is of the form 9~ s for some P-structure satisfying the 
propositional conditions. 
Such a supposition would be substantially correct if attention were 
confined to the modal values or existence sets represented in the 
different structures. But difficulties arise once the cardinality of facts 
with a given existence set is taken into account. For consider a fact 
with existence-set T. Each proposition with modal value (U, V), 
U M V = T, will correspond to a distinct fact with existence-set T. 
Moreover, each set of facts G will yield a proposition with modal 
value (U, V) if G determines U and the existence-set of G is V. We 
are therefore led to the following condition: 
Cardinality: If T ~ ES ~, then card{f E F : es(f) = T} >- 
card{(U, es(G)) : G determines U and U fq es(G) = T}. 
All four conditions - Diversity, World Actualism, Automorphism 
and Cardinality - on F-structures may then be called F-Cond. 
The separate conditions for P-  and F-structures may readily be 
combined to give the appropriate conditions for PF- and PFC- 
structures. For the former, we adopt: 
Diversity: Given any e ~ P, there are infinitely many f E P for 
which my( f )=  my(e). 
World Actualism: ~w = ~v implies ~w = ~v- 
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Automorphism: Suppose that B C A determines U and that es(B) 
is non-empty.  Then for some e ~ P, my(e) = (U, es(B)). 
PF-Correspondence: There is a one-one correspondence ~ between 
{e ~ P :its(e) ¢ &} and F for which es(~(e)) = its(e) for all e ~  din(7), 
Non-truth: (w, e) ~ t ~ e E P. 
Distinctness: e ~ P & f ~ F ~ e ~ f. 
In the automorphism condition, the automorphisms are now defined 
with respect  to the total PF-s t ruc ture  c¢. It is also allowed that 
arbitrary subsets of A = P t_/F may determine a truth-set. Although it 
is not  immediately obvious,  the separate P -  and F-condit ions on the 
derived structures c~p and ~ will then be a consequence.  
The conditions for PFC-structures are the same as for  PF-s t ruc-  
tures, but with 7 now the particular relation from the structure. We 
use PF-Cond .  and PFC-Cond.  for the respective sets of conditions. 
7. EQUIVALENCE 
We now prove some results on the equivalence of the different 
objectualist  conditions and of the circumstances in which the modal 
values of propositions can be recovered  from the corresponding facts. 
Before  establishing the results, it will be helpful to state some 
elementary results on the existence of automorphisms. Most of these 
results will apply to all monadic structures, i.e. to all structures 
defined on one-place predicates alone. But for  convenience,  we shall 
only state them for the P-s t ructures ,  and not for the F-  or P F -  
structures as well. 
Say that the pair a = ( a l ,  a2) is an isomorphism from the P -  
structure 9£ = (W, P, t) onto the P-s t ructure  ~3 = (V, (~, s) if al and a2 
are one-one maps from W onto V and from F onto G respectively 
for which (i) e~/~w iff a2(e)E/~,cw~ and (ii) ( w , e ) ~ t  iff 
(a~(w), a2(e)) ~ s. Call a~ a world-isomorphism from 9.1 onto ~3 if it is 
extendible to an isomorphism a = (al,  ct2) f rom ~ onto ~3. Then a 
necessary and sufficient condition for at  to be a world-isomorphism is 
given by: 
L E M M A  27. If 9 / and  ~ are P-s t ructures  and a3 is a one-one function 
from W onto V, then a~ is a world isomorphism from 9 /on to  ~ iff it 
respects modal values and cardinalities, i.e. iff a~(MV ~) = M V  ~ and 
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card{e ~ P : mv~(e) = (U, V)} = card{e ~ Q : mv'~(e) = (at(U),  a~(V))} 
for each (U, V} E M V  ~. 
Proof. The left-to-right direction is straightforward; and for the 
other direction, we may define an extension of a~ in the obvious way. 
As a special case of lemma 27, we obtain: 
C O R O L L A R Y  28(i): The one-one permutat ion at on W is a world- 
automorphism on the P-s t ruc ture  ?I iff ~ t ( M V ~ ) = M V  ~t and 
{e E P : rnv ~(e) = (U, V)} = card{e E P : mv'X(e) = (at(U), ~1(V))}. 
Thus given that al preserves modal values, all that need be got right 
for  a~ to be extendable to an automorphism is that it should preserve 
cardinalities. However ,  this last condition is not superfluous, since it 
is clear that the cardinality of the proposit ion with a given modal 
value and the cardinality of those with its image can differ. 
Call a permutat ion pair a = (al, ~2) on worlds and individuals trivial 
if a l ( w ) =  w for all w E  W and ~2(e)=I only if mrS(e) = mrS(f). 
Then another  consequence of lemma 27 is: 
C O R O L L A R Y  28(ii): All trivial permutation-pairs o~ = (al, 0~2) on a P -  
structure 91 are automorphisms. 
Proof. Since the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. 
A rather useful criterion for when a set of propositions determines a 
truth-set can be stated. Given a subset Q of P in the P-s t ructure  91, 
let m v [ Q ] = { m v ( e ) : e E Q } .  An automorphism o~ on 91 may be 
extended to modal values in the obvious way. We now have: 
C O R O L L A R Y  29: Given the P-s t ruc ture  91, Q c_ P and V C_ W, Q 
determines V iff rnv[Q] determines V. 
Proof. &Stra igh t forward ,  since it is readily shown that any 
automorphism fixed on e is fixed on my(e). 
Suppose Q determines V. Take any automorphism a fixed on 
my[Q]. Note that a need not be fixed on Q, since it may take an 
element of Q into an element outside of Q but with the same modal 
value. Define a new automorphism fl = (fit,/32) by: 
[3z(w) = w for  all w E W; 
/32(e) = e if my(e) ~ mv[Q]; 
[32(e) = a~I(e) if my(e) E mv[Q]. 
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By corollary 28(ii), /3 is an automorphism on 9~. Therefore  ~/= 
(/3~°al,/32°a2) is an automorphism on 91, and is fixed on Q, since, for  
e ~ Q, /32oa2(e) = a21oa2(e) = e. Since Q determines V, y1(V) = V. 
But y~ = a~; and so al (V)= V, as required. 
It is essential to this result that the concept  of determine in 'my[Q] 
determines V' be defined with respect  to automorphisms on the full 
structure 9L For, as we have noted, a permutat ion on worlds that 
merely respects the structure of the modal values M V  ~ need not be 
extendible to an automorphism on 9L 
Le t  us now establish the equivalence of P-Cond.  and F-Cond.  for 
their respective structures. One direction requires the following result 
to connect  the automorphisms in P -  and F-structures:  
L E M M A  30. If a = (at ,  a2) is an automorphism on the P-s t ructure  9~, 
then/3 = (c~, ~2 1 F)  is an automorphism on ~ = 9~ f. 
Proof. Let  /3 be as defined. Now al(its(e))=its(a2(e)); for 
Ctl(its(e))=al(ts(e) N es(e))=al(ts(e)) fq ctt(es(e))=ts(a2(e)) fq 
es(a2(e))=its(a2(e)). It follows that the range of /32 is 
F : for  if l ~ F, then its(f) ~ ok, so its(a2(f)) = al(its(f)) ~ ~, and so 
a2(f) ~ F ;  and, similarly, if l ~ F then a21( f )~  f. It also follows, for  
all f E F, that f ~ Fw iff /32(f) E P~lcw); for  the L.H.S.  holds iff w 
its(l), which holds iff a~(w)E a~(its(f))= its(a2(f)), which holds itf 
/3~(w)~ es(/32(f)), i.e. iff /32(f)~/~cw). Therefore  the two conditions 
for /3  being an automorphism on ~ are satisfied. 
It can now be shown that: 
L E M M A  31: If the P-s t ruc ture  9~ satisfies P-Cond,  then the asso- 
ciated F-s t ructure  9~ ~ satisfies F-Cond.  
Proof. Assume that 9~ satisfies P-Cond.  We show that ~ = 9~ s 
satisfies each of the conditions of  F-Cond.  in turn. 
Diversity: The justification is similar to the intuitive one. Take any 
f ~ F. Then f E P. So G = {g ~ P : mv~(g) = mv~(f)} is infinite, by 
P-Diversi ty.  But each g ~ G is in F and has es~(g) = es~(f). There-  
fore {g ~ F : ese(g) = es~(f)} is, also infinite. 
World Actualism: Suppose that w e  v. From the proof  of lemma 
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4.18 in [15], it follows that for each w E W, there is an ew ~ P such 
that its~(ew) = {w}. But then ew ~ Pw - -P~ and ~we ~ ,  as required. 
Automorphism: Suppose that G C F determines U C W w.r.t, the 
structure ~ and that ese(G) M U ~  q~. For each f E G, it follows by 
the construction of ~ = ~ ,  that i ts~(f)= es~(f); and so, by Coin- 
cidence, there is a coincident proposition f '  of 92 for which ts~(f ') = 
es~(f). Let G ' = { f ' : f E G } .  Then note that es~(G' )=es~(G')= 
es~(G). 
Since G determines U in ~3 and {es~(f) : f E G} = {ts~(f ') : f  E G}, it 
follows by corollary 29 and lemma 30 that G' determines U in 91. 
Since es~(G ') = ese(G) is non-empty, it follows by P-Automorphism 
that (U, e s ~ ( G ' ) ) E M V  'x. Choose an e ~ P  for which rnv~(e) = 
(U, es~(G')). Now U M es~(G ') = U Cl es~(G) is non-empty. So e ~ F 
and has es~(e) = its~(e) = U M es~(G), as required. 
Cardinality: Take T E E S  ~, and consider (U, V) and G C_ F for 
which: es~(G)= V, G determines U in ~3, and U ~ V = T. Then it 
suffices to show that (U, V}~ M V  ~. Define G' as before. Then G' 
determines U in 92 and es~(G')=ese(G)  = V. Therefore by 
Automorphism for 92, (U, V ) ~  M V  ~. 
The proof of the other direction of the equivalence requires a 
preliminary definition and result. Given an F-structure ~ ,  define the 





W = V ;  
P = {(U, es~(G), ~); G C_ F determines U C W in ~ and 
is an ordinal _< max(oJ, card{f E F : es~(f) = U ¢q es~(G)})}; 
/Sw ={(U, V , ~ ) E P : w E  W}; 
t = { ( w , ( U ,  V, ~)) ~ W × P  : w E  U}.  
LEMMA 32: If the F-structure ~ satisfies F-Cond., then any world 
automorphism/31 on ~ is also a world automorphism on 92 = ~P. 
Proof, Under the conditions of the lemma, suppose that /3t is 
extendible to an automorphism /3 = (/3~,/327 on ~. By corollary 28, /3~ 
is a world automorphism on 92 = ~P if it preserves modal values and 
cardinalities. Let us establish each condition in turn. 
First, suppose that ( U , V ) E M V  ~ (in order to show that 
(/31(U),/32(V)) E MV~). By the construction of 92, there is a G C F for 
which G determines U in ~ and ese(G)= V. It follows that /32(G) 
determines /3~(U) in ~.  For suppose that the ~-automorphism a = 
106 KIT F I N E  
(al ,  a2) is fixed on 132(G). Then a2(/32(f)) =/32(f) for all [ E G. There- 
fore the ~-automorphism (/3T ~o a~ ~,/3~o a j  l) is fixed on G. But then 
/3~loa~l(U) = U. So U=a~([Jl(U)); and [32(G) determines /31(U). 
Also, we have that es~([32(G)) = [3~(ese(G))=/3~(V). Hence 
([3t(U), [3~(V)) ~ M V  ~, as required. 
Secondly,  take any (U, V) ~ M V  ~. Then c = 
card{e ~ P : mv~(e) = (U, V)} = max(w, card{f ~ F : es~(f) = U ~ V}) 
and, similarly, d = card{e ~ P : mv~(e) = (/3~(U),/3~(V))} = 
max(w, card{f ~ F:es~(f)=/3~(U) C)/3~(V)}). But since /3~ is a per- 
mutation on W, /3~(U f~ V) = / 3 ( U 0  f3 [32(B) and, so since /3 respects 
cardinalities in ~3, c = d. 
It  can now be shown that: 
L E M M A  33: Given an F-s t ructure  ~ satisfying F-Cond. ,  there is a 
P-s t ruc ture  9/sat isfying P -Cond  for which 91t = ~3. 
Proof. Let  ~3 be an F-s t ructure  satisfying F-Cond.  We show that 
91 = U P is isomorphic to a P-s t ructure  of the required sort. First, let 
us go through the conditions in turn: 
Diversity: It follows from the construction of 91 that, for each 
(U, V , ~ ) ~ P ,  mv((U, V,~))=(U,  V). But then, mv((U, V,n))= 
(U, V) for n = 0, 1, 2 . . . . .  
World Actualism: Suppose w~  v. Then by World Actualism and 
Differentiation for ~3, there is an f ~ Fw, say, without f ~ P,. Clearly, 
G = {f} determines U = es~(f). Therefore  e = (U, U, o) ~ P. But then 
e E Pw and yet not e ~ / 5 ,  as required. 
Automorphism: Suppose that Q c_ P determines U C_ W in 91 and 
that es~(Q)= V is non-empty.  Then we must  show that (U, V ) ~  
M V  ~. Suppose, for each e ~ Q, that tara(e) = (Ue, Ve). Then for each 
such e there is a Ge_C F such that Ge determines Ue in ~ and 
ese(G~) = V e. Let  G = u,eoQ~. Then es~(G) = U~eQeSe(Ge)= 
U eeO Ve = es~(Q) = V. 
Le t  ~o = mv~(Q). Clearly, G determines each pair (U~, V,) of ~f in 
~3. Also, since Q determines U in 9I, ~ determines U in 91, by 
corollary 29; and so • determines U in ~3 by lemma 32. But then G 
determines U in ~3, and so (U, es~(G)) = (U, V) E M V  ~. 
Coincidence: Suppose (U, V ) ~  M V  ~ with U f3 V non-empty.  For 
some G C F, G determines U in ~ and es~(G) = V. Since U rq V is 
non-empty,  U fl V ~ ES e. Choose f ~ F with es~(f) = U (3 V. Then 
{f} determines U Q V in ~3. So (U (3 V, U f3 V) ~ M V  ~, as required. 
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Finally, it must be shown that 9~ s is isomorphic to ~3. In view of 
lemma 27, it suffices to show that (a) ITS  ~ = E S  ~ and that (b) for each 
T ~ ITS  ~, card{e ~ P : its~(e) = T} = card{f ~ F : es~(f) = T}. As for 
(a), suppose first that T ~ E S  ~, with es~(e) = T. Then since {e} 
determines U in ~ ,  (U, U) E M V  ~ and hence U ~ ITS  ~. Now sup- 
pose that T ~ I T S  ~ with i t s (e)= T and m y ( e ) = ( U ,  V). Then for 
some G C F, es~(G)= V and G determines U in ~3. Therefore by 
Automorphism for ~3, T = U N V ~ E S  ~e. 
As for (b), let c = card{e ~ P : its~(e) = T} and d = 
card{f ~ F : es~(f) = T}. Then c = card{(U, V, ~) : U N V = T, ~ -< d, 
and for some G _ F ,  e s ~ ( G ) = V  and G determines U}=  
card{(U, es(G)): U n es(G) = T and G determines U}.d. But by Car- 
dinality for ~ ,  K = card{(U, es(G)) : U n es(G) = T and G determines 
U}<-d. So C = K . d = d .  
Putting lemmas 31 and 33 together gives the equivalence of the two 
sets of conditions: 
THEOREM 34: An F-structure ~ satisfies F-Cond.  iff it is of the 
form ~ for some P-structure 9~ that satisfies P-Cond.  
Similar results can be proved for the conditions imposed on PF-  and 
PFC-structures.  It is, first of all, a trivial matter to show: 
L E M M A  35: If ~ is any PF-structure satisfying PF-Cond. ,  then (~p)s 
is isomorphic to ~¢. 
We now have: 
L E M M A  36: If ~ satisfies PF-  or PFC-Cond. ,  then ~P satisfies 
P-Cond.  and ~J satisfies F-Cond.  
Proof. Given lemmas 31 and 35, it suffices to prove the result for 
~o. So supposing that 9~ satisfies PF-Cond. ,  let us consider each of 
the conditions of P-Cond.  in turn. 
Diversity: Trivial. 
World Actualism: Use the fact  {w} will belong to TS~. 
Automorphism:  Suppose Q c_ P determines V C W in ~P. Then Q 
determines V in ~, since any automorphism on ~ restricts to an 
automorphism on ~P. The rest then follows by Automorphism for ~. 
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Coincidence: Suppose that e ~ P and that its(e) = V is non-empty. 
Let f = 3,(e) for a correspondence 3, from the conditions on ~. Then 
es(f) = its(e). Clearly, {f} determines V. So by Automorphism on ~, 
(V, V} E M V  ¢, as required. 
The other direction of the equivalence is given by: 
LEMMA 37: (i) Any structure 91 satisfying P-Cond. is of the form ~P 
for some ~ satisfying PF-Cond.; 
(ii) any structure ~ satisfying F-Cond. is of the form ~f for some 
satisfying PF-Cond. 
Proof. Again, given lemmas 33 and 35, it suffices to prove case (i). 
So take 92 =(W,/5, t) satisfying P-Cond. Let ~ = 92ps, i.e. for ~ a 
copy (W, F) of 92I, F disjoint from P, ~ = (W, 15, F, t). Clearly ~P = 92. 
So it remains to show that ~ satisfies PF-Cond. 
Of the various conditions, only Automorphism is not completely 
trivial. Suppose, then, that B C_ A determines U and that es(B) is 
non-empty. Let B' = (B (1 P) U {e ~ P : ts(e) = es(e) = es(f) for f E 
B M F}. By corollary 29, B' also determines U in ~; and by lemma 
30, any automorphism on 92 can be extended to an automorphism on 
~. Therefore B' determines U in 9I. Now, es¢(B ') = ese(B). So by 
Automorphism for 91, (U, e s ( B ) ) ~ M V  ~, and hence (U, e s (B) )~  
M V  ~, as required. 
Combining lemmas 36 and 37 gives: 
THEOREM 40:92 satisfies P-Cond(F-Cond) iff it is of the form 
~P(resp. ~t) for some ~ satisfying PF-Cond. 
It is almost trivial that the PF-structure ~ satisfies PF-Cond. iff it is 
of the form ~p,i for some PFC-structure ~ satisfying PFC-Cond. 
Therefore the above theorems may readily be extended to PFC- 
structures. 
Similar results might be established for structures subject to more 
or to fewer conditions. One possibility is to drop the coincidence 
condition on P-structures. An examination of the proof of lemma 31 
then quickly reveals that when 92 satisfies the remaining conditions of 
P-Cond, 92s satisfies the conditions of F-Cond. other than Car- 
dinality; and so it might be of interest to determine if a converse 
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result holds or, if not, what further consequences the conditions on 
the P-structures have for the F-structures.  In the other direction, one 
might add such conditions as Determinacy from §8 of [15] to P-Cond.  
and consider their equivalents for F-structures.  
Given these results, it is natural to ask to what extent information is 
lost in the passage from propositions to facts. More exactly, we may 
ask to what extent the 9~ satisfying P-Cond.  for which 92t ___ ~ ,  are, 
for a fixed ~ ,  unique up to isomorphism. 
There are two main ways in which the 92's may fail to be unique. 
First, the cardinalities of {e ~ P : m v ~ ( e ) =  (U, V}} may vary when 
U n V = &. But also M V  ~, even TS '~, can vary. For consider the ~o 
P-structure 92 = (W,/5, t) (each 0 c : my(f)  = e} countably infinite) for 
which: 
(i) W = {wl, w2, w3, w4}, for wl, w2, w3 and w4 all distinct; 
(ii) M V  ~ = {(W, W), (4~, W)} N {(U, {w}): U _C W and w ~ W}. 
Then 92 satisfies P-Cond.  However,  the associated F-structure 92I 
merely contains the existence-sets {w~}, i =  1, 2, 3, 4, and W and so 
(92J)P will merely contain the truth-sets O, {w~}, W -  {wi}, and W. 
Although not provable, the requirement that the truth-sets of 92 be 
recoverable from 92I is a reasonable one. For it amounts to the 
actualist-type claim that the facts should determine all of the pos- 
sibilities, that the appeal to the truth of non-existent propositions 
should be redundant. It is therefore natural to consider under what 
additional conditions on ~ the requirement might be met. 
Let  us adopt the Determinacy Assumption from §8 of [15]. When 
stated in semantical terms, it becomes: 
Determinacy: Suppose that w, v, u E W, /sw n/5~ =/sw n/su and 
that, for some e E/Sw, ts(e) N {v, u} = {V}. Then for some f ~/sw N/5~, 
ts(f) N {v, u} = {v}. 
The plausibility of this condition was argued for in [15]. 
As an almost immediate consequence, we have that worlds dis- 
tinguished by an actual proposition are distinguished by an actual 
fact: 
LEMMA 41: Suppose, for a P-structure 92 satisfying Automorphism 
and Determinacy, that w, v, u E W and that, for some e ~ Pw, ts(e) N 
{v, u} is singleton. Then for some f E/5, both w E its(f) and its(f) n 
{v, u} is singleton. 
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Proof. We distinguish two cases. (1) /sw n 15~ P~ N/5,, say g 
/Sw n / 5  but g ~ / 5  O P~. By Automorphism, there is an f E P such 
that ts(f) = es(f) = es(g). It is then clear that w ~ its(f) and its (f) n 
{v, u} = {v}. (2) / 5  n t5~ = / 5  n / 5 .  Suppose, without loss of general- 
ity, that ts(e) n {v, u} = {v}. By Determinacy, there is a g ~/Sw N/5 
for which ts(g) N{v, u}={v}. If w ~ts(g) ,  let f = g. Otherwise, 
choose f, by Automorphism, to have modal value ( W -  ts(e), es(e)). 
We may now obtain: 
THEOREM 42: Suppose that the P-structure 9~ satisfies World 
Actualism, Automorphism, and Determinacy. Then Fw determines U 
in ~ = ~s whenever U E TSw. 
Proof. Suppose that ~ satisfies the conditions and that U ~ TS~, 
with eo ~/Sw and ts(eo) = U. By World Actualism and Automorphism, 
there is, for any u E U and v ~ W - U ,  an e, call it e .... for which 
ts(e) N {u, v} is singleton. So by lemma 41, there is an f~,~ E 15~ such 
that w ~ i t s ( w )  and its(f~,~)n{u,v} is singleton. Since its(fu,~) is 
non-empty, each f~,~ ~ F and es~(f~,~) = its~(f~,~). 
It now follows that/~w determines U in ~.  It suffices to show that, 
for each a fixed on Fw, a(U)C_ U; for if a is fixed on Fw, so is a-z; 
and a(U) C U and a-l(U) C U imply a(U) ~- U. Suppose then, for an 
a fixed on P~, that a ( U ) ~  U; say u E U and v = a(u)~. U. Now 
f,,~ ~ Fw and es~(fu,~) n {u, v} is singleton. But then ese(fu,~) cannot be 
invariant under a, and so a is not fixed on Fw after all. 
Note that the proof does not call for a full use of the Automorphism 
condition, but merely of the truth of a few instances of the Compre- 
hension scheme. By examining the proof, we also see that U may be 
expressed by a proposition in disjunctive normal form from atomic 
propositions to the effect that a given fact fu,~ exists: 
The above result is related to the result on the definability of outer 
truth T in terms of inner truth T ÷, presented in section 8 of [15]. Both 
make use of the Determinacy condition; and the inner truth of a 
proposition corresponds, in the natural way, to the existence of a fact. 
However, the present result cannot be derived from the earlier one by 
the simple device of replacing reference to propositions and their 
inner truth in the definition of T by reference to facts and their 
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existence; for the definition also makes use of the actualist notion ~ ÷  
of strict implication, which is not eliminable in this way. 
Although the requirement that the truth-sets of propositions be 
recoverable from the facts is a reasonable one and can be proved 
under suitable assumptions, the stronger requirement that all modal 
values be recoverable from the facts is not reasonable and cannot be 
proved, even with the addition of Determinacy. For since it may be 
the P-structure 9.I = NP for which 91I = ~ ,  what will be required is 
that, for each modal value my(e) = (U, V), there should be a set of 
facts G such that G determines U and es(G) = V. But although some 
facts will determine U, there will be no guarantee that the existence- 
conditions for those facts can be made to coincide with V, because of 
peculiarities in the way the existence-conditions of the facts are 
obtained. To be specific, let 92[ = (W,/5, t) be the o) P-structure for 
which: 
(i) W = {W|, W2, W3, W4} , for wl, w2, w~, w4 all distinct; 
(ii) MV~ = {{W, W), {4), W)} U {{U, {wi, wj})" 
U C W ,  I<-i<-j<--4}. 
Then 92[ satisfies both P-Cond. and Determinacy. But the existence- 
sets of 91s consist of W, {wi} and {wi, wi} for i ¢ j. So {{w3}, {wl, w2}) is 
not a modal value of (9Is) p, even though it is of 9I. 
8. O B J E C T U A L I S T  T H E O R I E S  
We shall consider the various objectualist theories, both in a seman- 
tical and in a syntactical light. In each case, we shall investigate their 
status, as decidable or axiomatizable, and their relationship to the 
other theories. 
Let P-Th*, F-Th*, PF-Th*, PFC-Th* be the theories determined 
by the respective conditions P-Cond, F-Cond, PF-Cond, and PFC- 
Cond. For 4, from ~i, let 4)0 be the result of relativizing the variables 
to the predicate F. Then from the previous equivalence theorems, the 
following conservative extension results may readily be proved: 
THEOREM 43: 
(i) For each sentence 4, of ~l,  F-Th* ~ 4, iff PF-Th* ~- 4,0; 
(ii) For each sentence 4) of ~fP, P-Th* ~ 4, iff PF-Th* ~ 4)0; 
(iii) For each sentence 4) of ~p.s, PF-Th* ~- 4) iff PFC-Th* ~- 4). 
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Some translations between the various theories may also be set up. 
Between ~f¢ and ~ ; ,  we may use the translation &P from §5: 
THEOREM 44: For each sentence ~b of ~ i  
Th* ~ ck p. 
Proof .  From lemma 14 and theorem 34. 
F-Th* ~- ~b iff P-  
However,  in this case, no reverse reduction, from ~ "  to ~g~ would 
appear to be possible. 
Between PF-Th* and P-Th*, the translations 6 ° and ~b p may again 
be used: 
THEOREM 45: For each sentence tk of ~P and 6 of 3f p's 
(i) P-TH* ~- t9 ~ PF-Th* ~- ~o; 
(ii) PF-Th* ~- 6 f f  P-Th* ~- 6 p; 






From theorem 34. 
One part is trivial and the other follows from lemma 21. 
In the case of Th*-PF and Th*-PFC,  we can no longer use the 
reduction in which Px ^ Fy  ^ F3(T+x =- Ey) replaced xCy,  since the 
empirical criterion of identity is no longer available. However,  the 
translation 6 p may be extended even further. For given a formula 6 
of 5f p'f'c, +P may be obtained by making the previous replacements in 
6 + and, in addition, by replacing sub-occurrences of piCf i with pi = crj 
and sub-occurrences of piCpi, fjCfj or fjCpi with 3_. In analogy to 
lemma 21, it may now be shown that: 
L E M M A  46: For 6 '  = 6'(Pl . . . . .  p~, fl . . . . .  f , )  a formula of Sg p's'c with 
free variables among pl . . . . .  Pro, f l  . . . . .  f , ,  the sentence ([]) 
~r~CI~ ~ 6 ' ( o l  . . . .  , o , . ,  I1 . . . . .  In )  - 6 ~ ' ° ( o ~  . . . . .  ore, o'1 . . . . .  ,~n is 
a logical consequence of Distinctness, Non-truth and the Cor- 
respondence axioms. 
From this it then follows that: 
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THEOREM 47: For each sentence 4) of 5fP'i'c: 
(i) PFC-Th* ~-- & iff PF-Th* ~- q5 P'°; 
(ii) PFC-Th* ~ d, -~ ~b "'°. 
Proof. (ii) follows from the lemma. (i) then follows from (ii) and 
theorem 43. 
The various theories P-Th*, F-Th*, PF-Th* and PFC-Th* are all 
non-axiomatizable. The non-axiomatizability result for the theory P 
in §6 of [15] is of no help in this regard, since there the Coincidence 
condition was not adopted. However,  a new method may be used to 
establish the non-axiomatizability of F-Th* and hence of the other 
theories. 
THEOREM 48: The theory F-Th* is not axiomatizable. 
Proof. Let T + be the second-order theory of two equivalence 
relations E1 and E2 (the quantification is over arbitrary sets and all 
valid sentences are to be theorems). By methods deriving from 
Rogers [34], it may be shown that T + is non-axiomatizable and, 
indeed, is equivalent in undecidability to full second-order logic. For 
any sentence ~b of T +, we produce a translate 4~* in ~s  as follows. 
First, divide the fact variables into two distinct groups: 
al, a2, bl, b2 . . . .  and f~,f2 . . . .  respectively. Second, replace each 
atomic formula xiE~j, for zr = 1,2, by Hf[VI(Ea= D El)  
([[](Ebi D El)  - E](Ebj D Ef))], and each atomic formula xi ~ Xj by 
[](Ebi D Efj). Finally, replace each subformula Vxit~ by l-Ibi(~Wb~ ^ 
O(Ebi ^ - E a r  ^ -Ea2) )DqJ)  and each subformula VXiqJ by Hfi~O. 
Then it may be shown that: 
the sentence ~b is a theorem of T + iff Ha~IIa2[(O Wal ^ 
OWa2) D 4~*] is a theorem of Th*-F. 
The proof of the right-to-left direction is relatively straightforward. 
For the proof of the other direction, suppose that the sentence 4~ is 
not a theorem of T +. Then ~b is false in some classical structure 
= (X, ~1, ~2) with two equivalence relations e~ and E2 on X. Without 
loss of generality, we may suppose that X is infinite, say of car- 
dinality K. Now define a structure 2~ = (W, F)  by: 
(i) W = X U{wl, w2}, for wl, w2 distinct elements foreign to 
X, 
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(ii) 
(iii) 
F = {(V,~): V C W, ~-<2 K and V is closed under el if it 
contains w~ and is closed under e2 if it contains w2}; 
~ = ( ( v ,  ¢ ) E  F :  w ~ V}. 
Then it may be shown that ~ satisfies F-Cond. and that ~ is also 
counter-model for I Ia lHa2[(~  Wal  ^ ~ Wa2) ~ qS*]. 
Theorem 48 also provides a new proof of the non-axiomatizability 
of the theory P from [15]. For let 40 be the sentence ([])[T+p 
3~(Vl(Ttr - Ecr) A ~(T+cr - T+p))]. Then ~b0 expresses exactly the 
content of the Coincidence Condition. Therefore the sentence + will 
be a theorem of P-Th* iff 4034~ is a theorem of P;  and so the 
non-axiomatizability of P-Th* will carry over to P. 
Two further features of this result are worth noting. One is that it is 
not essential to the proof that the language ~ of F-Th* contain 
identity. Thus we have another example of a pure existence theory 
that is of intuitive significance and yet is non-axiomatizable. 
Secondly, the theory F-Th* (without identity) can be expressed 
within the classical language of second-order logic, with quantification 
over sets corresponding to quantification over facts. Now as is 
well-known, the classical logic is decidable. But the present theory, in 
its translation, only differs from that logic in the intended range of the 
set variables; for the logic it is arbitrary, while for the theory it is 
subject to the automorphism condition. It is therefore of interest that 
such a small, but well-motivated, change, should turn a decidable 
system into one that is not axiomatizable. 
Let us now attempt a partial axiomatization of the various seman- 
tically determined theories, in analogy to the treatment in §5 of [15]. 
First, we present a theory F-Th for facts alone. The objectualist 
abstraction axiom for facts takes the form: 
Abs t rac t ion:  V l V f 1 . . .  Vf,[(~b ^ El l  A . . .  ^ E l , )  
3g[ ] (Eg  - (cb ^ Ef~ ^ . . .  ^ E/n))], where f l , . . . ,  f ,  are exactly the 
free variables of & and g itself does not occur free in (b. 
The single propositional requirement on the existence of facts has 
been replaced by a composite propositional-cum-objectual require- 
ment. Note that this is a scheme whose form is sensitive to the 
underlying language. Thus if there is reference to individuals or to 
other constituents, then their existence must be included in the 
existence conditions. 
This scheme differs in subtle ways from its naive counterpart. 
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Define the negation, conjunction and disjunction of facts by: 
g N e g f  for ~(Eg = -E l ) ;  
h Conj g,f  for C3(Eh =- (Eg A El)); 
h Disj g, f for [2](Eh =- (Eg v El)). 
We then have, as with the naive scheme: 
LEMMA 49: From F-Abstraction may be derived 
U]VfVg3h(h Conj f, g). 
However, the analogues of this result for Disj and Neg cannot be 
derived. Certain difficulties over []Vf3g(g Neg f) have nothing to do 
with objectual considerations; for the fact f may be necessary and, in 
any case, the fact g will not co-exist with f. But the amended 
principle for Neg., (ff])[-Ef D 3g(g Negf)] ,  and the standard prin- 
ciple for Disj., E]Vf, g3h(h Disj, f, g), will still fail. For let ~ be the o) 
F-structure in which W "~- {Wl, W2, W3, W4} and ES ~ = {{wi}: i = 
1 . . . . .  4} LJ {{wi, wj} : 1 -< i < j  --<4} t3 {W}. Then ~ satisfies F-Cond. But 
{w2, w3, w4}~ ES ~, which, given {w~} ~ ES ~, invalidates the principle, 
for Neg, and which, given {w~, w2}, {w~, w3}~ ES ~, invalidates the 
principle for Disj. 
The axioms of the theory F-Th are now F-Abstraction, F-Diver- 
sity, World-Fact, and Conjunctive Closure for facts. The last three 
axioms have already been stated in §5 and so need not be restated 
here. 
It will be recalled that a covering axiom was required for the theory 
of determinate facts in §2 and for the objectualist theory of pro- 
positions in [15]. It is therefore remarkable that Covering is redundant 
in the present context, though the proof is by no means trivial. 
LEMMA 50: Covering is a theorem of F-Th. 
Proof. Let us proceed semantically. Suppose (91, w ) ~ -  El, for 
f ~ F, and, using World-Fact, choose e0 ~ F for which w ~ Weo. By 
Abstraction, there is a g ~ F such that 91 ~ [](Eg - 
(Eeo ^ -3hO(Eeo ^ -Eh))). Then 9X~l-7(Eg D - E l ) .  For otherwise, 
(91, v ) ~  Eg ^ E f  for some y E W .  But then (91, v ) ~  3hO(Eeo ^ 
-Eh) ,  contradicting 91 ~ [](Eg =- (Eeo ^ -3h©(Eeo ^ -Eh))). 
It may be shown that the theory Th-F is sound for its intended 
semantics. 
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THEOREM 51: The theorems of Th-F are true in each F-structure 
satisfying F-Cond. 
Proof. The only problematic case is Abstraction, and that may be 
proved by techniques similar to those used in the proof of validity for 
P-Abstraction in theorem 31 of [15]. 
By following the proof of theorem 33 in [15], it may also be shown 
that: 
THEOREM 52: The four axioms of F-Th are independent. 
Proof. The modifications to the earlier proof are, for the most part, 
clear. In the case of conjunctive closure, one may let ~ be the ~o 
F-structure (W, F) for which W = {(3, 1, 2 . . . .  } and ES = {V C_ W : V 
is co-finite if 0, 1 ~ V and V is finite if 0 ~ V but 1 ~ V}; and one 
may let the formula 4/, in Conjunctive Closure, be [](Eh D El). Then, 
as before, it may be shown that ~ is a model for the other axioms, but 
that (~, 0)~ 3g(g ConjF](Eh D El), for es(h) = {1}. 
As in the case of the objectualist propositional systems, what is most 
striking about this result is the independence of Conjunctive Closure 
from Abstraction. 
Comparable systems may be set up for the other semantical 
theories. For the theory P-Th., we require the axioms of the theory 
D V  of [15] - viz. Abstraction, Covering, World-Proposition, Con- 
junctive Closure and Diversity, plus: 
Coincidence: [~Vp[Tp D 3~([](Tcr =- Ecr) ^ ~(T~r = T+p))] 
For the theory PF-Th., we require the axioms or schemes of P-Th. 
and F-Th., plus the axioms: 
Non-truth: (El)(- Tf); and 
Distinctness : (~)(p ~ f). 
The theory PFC-Th requires, in addition, the following six axioms for 
C: 
Correspondence: 
(i) ([])[xCy D Px ^ Fy]; 
(ii) (Vq)t(pCf ^ crCg) D (p = cr ~- f = g)]; 
(iii) (U])(pCf D []oCf]; 
(iv) VlVo(To D ::lf(pCf)); 
(V) FqVf~p(pCf); 
(vi) (I-7)[pCf D [](T+p =-- Ef)]. 
Axioms (ii) is a principle of internal identity, (iii) of external identity, 
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(iv) and (v) of internal existence, and (vi) of external existence. 
Axioms (iv) and (vi) combine to form the correspondence thesis 
[--]Vp(r O D 3ff- l(EI - T+O)). 
Great simplifications may be made to the mixed systems Pf-Th and 
PFC-Th. The axiom of Coincidence is redundant in both. For arguing 
intuitively, suppose we are given a proposition p for which T+p. Then 
there exists a fact f for which C.](T÷p =- El)  by F-Abstraction. So 
there exists a proposition 0- for which Z](T0- =- El)  and [](Eo- =- El),  
by P-Abstraction. But then VI(T0-- E0-) and [](TO- =-T÷p), as 
required. 
The axiom of Conjunctive Closure for facts is also redundant in 
both systems. For let ~b be the formula 3f(qJ ^ [2](Tp = - E l ) ^  
[-'](Ep =-- El)). From Conjunctive Closure for propositions, 
30"(0- Conj ~) may be derived. But by letting "g"  be the fact that "0"" 
is true, we may then derive 3g(g Conj¢ ~). 
As with the anti-objectualist systems, F-Abstraction may be 
replaced with PF-Correspondence; [ V p ( T p  D 3 f [ ] (E f  -~ T+p)), and 
World-Fact may be dropped. Also, P-Abstraction may be limited to 
the case in which ~b is a sentence of 27 p. But then FP-Correspondence 
must be added and Coincidence retained as axioms. 
In Th-PFC, the existence for facts can be defined in terms of 
correspondence and propositional truth via the equivalence ([~) 
[El =- 3p(pCf ^ Tp)]. Hence all of the axioms for facts alone can be 
derived from this definition and the related theorems for propositions. 
Thus the theory PFC-Th is seen to provide a natural setting for an 
account of facts, with the principles concerning facts alone having no 
independent status, but merely being consequences of the proposi- 
tional theory and of the general principles governing the relation of 
correspondence. 
Two further simplifications may be made to PFC-Th. First, F-  and 
hence P-Rigidity may be dropped, since they are derivable from the 
correspondence axioms (v), (iii), and (i). Secondly, given lemma 46, 
P-Abstraction may be restricted to formulas ~b of ~P. 
Some of the results on conservative extensions and translations for 
the semantical systems may be extended to the syntactical ones. In 
analogy to parts (ii) and (iii) of theorem 43, it may be shown that: 
THEOREM 53: 
(i) For each sentence 4~ of 5f", P-Th ~- ~b iff PF-Th  ~- 4~°; 
(ii) For each sentence 4~ of 5f p J, PF-Th  ~- rb iff PFC-Th ~- 49. 
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Proof.  (i) ~ Trivial 
Suppose 91 is a model for P-Th and N ~: 4). Then show 
that 91 p'l is a model for PF-Th  and that 9/P'I ,~ 4)0. To this end, it is 
best to use the formulation of P F - T h  in which P-Abstraction is 
restricted to formulas 4) of ~P and P F -  and FP-Correspondence are 
axioms. 
(ii) ~ Trivial 
© Suppose that, for some model N = (~, w) for PF-Th ,  N~4) .  By 
the Skolem-Ltwenhe im theorem, we may suppose that W and A = 
P U F are countable. But it can then be easily shown that there is a 
one-one correspondence 7 between {e ~ P : its(e) ~ (k} and F. Adding y 
to N gives a PFC-model  X ÷. It may now be shown that N ÷ makes 4) false 
and, given that C need not appear in the instances of P-Abstraction, that 
N ÷ is a model for PFC-Th. 
Turning to reductions, we have in analogy to the substantial parts 
of theorems 45 and 47: 
THEOREM 54: For each sentence 4) of 5fP'f: 
(i) P F - T h  ~- 4) iff P-Th ~-4)P; 
(ii) P F - T h  ~- 4) - (49P) °. 
THEOREM 55: For each sentence 4) of 5fP'~'c: 
(i) P F C - T h  ]-- 4) if[ P - T h t -  6P; 
(ii) P F C - T h  }-- 4) = 4, p. 
Proof.  Given theorem 53, part (i) of each theorem will follow 
from part (ii). Part (ii) then follows from lemmas 21 and 46. 
This is as far as I have been able to take such results. I have not been 
able to show that for 4) a sentence of ~ff, PF-Th~-4) ° implies 
F-The-4)  or, equivalently, given the other results, that P-Th}--4) p 
implies F-Th ~-4); though the result seems plausible. 
In analogy to §7 of [15], many different extensions or modifications 
to our basic system may be considered. Rather than give a survey, let 
us merely give a few examples along with their more interesting 
features. First of all, the syntactic consequences of imposing certain 
metaphysical conditions on a structure may be considered. Some of 
these, such as Determinacy, will be exactly expressible within the 
language, but others will not. 
Secondly, one might experiment with the criteria of identity. In one 
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direction, one might adopt an empirical criterion, either for facts alone 
or for facts and propositions together. In this case, the previous 
difficulties over cardinality on the semantical approach would disap- 
pear, although the negative results on axiomatizability would still 
obtain, since they did not depend upon the presence of identity in the 
language. In the other direction, one might explore some of the more 
refined consequences of adopting a structural criterion of identity. For 
example, one might follow §2 of [15] by assuming card{e E A : m y ( e )  = 
(U, V)} = card{e ~ A : m y ( e )  = ( W  - U, V)} and generalisations of that 
sort. Such assumptions would then have corresponding consequences 
for the identity of facts. 
Finally, one might add a notation for fact abstracts, introduce 
quantification over sets of facts, or allow for the use of pseudo- 
classes in the formulation of the axioms. If fact abstracts are intro- 
duced, with q ~b denoting the fact that &, then F-Abstraction will take 
the form: 
(7-I)[(4~ A Et~ A . . .  A E tn )  D I-q(Eq~b ~ (4) ^ Et~ A . . .  A Et,))], 
where t~ . . . . .  tn are all of the 'individual' terms to occur in d,. If, in 
addition, propositional abstraction (§) and correspondence (C) are 
introduced, then the scheme: 
should be added as an axiom. For the most part, though, the treatment 
will follow that in [15]. 
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i c h i g a n  
N O T E S  
Proponents of sentential reference include Russell [34], Prior [27] and Rundle [33]. 
Belnap and others [4] have tried to avoid singular reference to propositions in their 
pro-sentential theory of truth, and they might wish to apply similar considerations to 
facts. Those on the other side include Baylis [3], Slote [37] and Williamson [44]. 
2 Here, as elsewhere, I have been sloppy over use-mention; but my meaning should be 
clear, even when my language is not. The above account is, of course, an elucidation, 
not a definition, of correspondence, since the sentence 4~ has a schematic role. It might 
be thought that correspondence could be defined as f being identical to the fact that O 
is true; but this would not be correct on a highly structuralist conception of facts. 
To give the general form of the argument, let us use the quantifier Vx to range over 
the actuals of each world and the quantifier Hx to range over a more inclusive domain. 
Use F • as a predicate for the possible F = ers and E as a predicate for existence. Then 
from [ ] ¥ x ( F x D - G x )  and the auxiliary premisses I I x ( F * x D © ( E x  ^ Fx)) and 
Flx(Gx D [3(Ex D [](Ex D Gx)), it logically follows that "flx(F* x D - Gx). Thus given the 
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categorial nature of the objects that satisfy G, the actual F ' s  and the possible F ' s  
cannot be distinguished in regard to whether they are G's. 
4 This is a point that is rarely appreciated and which I myself overlooked in the 
reduction of possibilist discourse in [10]. I there proposed a separate reduction for 
possible individuals and possible worlds. But there is, in fact, a common reduction, 
taking quantification over the possibles, be they individuals or worlds, into 
quantification over the actuals. What confuses the issue is that (a) the worlds may also 
be used to secure back reference to the given world in the common reduction, though 
other devices may be used in their place and (b) the quantification over actual worlds 
may be further reduced, to world-propositions, perhaps, or world facts. If the aspects 
(a) or (b) are combined with the world-reduction, then the common element with the 
individual-reduction is easily overlooked. 
Note that the argument does not require that the reduced theory contain the identity 
predicate. Identity provides the simplest case, but any predicate that enables one to 
discriminate some entities y~, Y2 . . . . .  Ym of Y -  X from all entities xl, x2 . . . . .  xm of X 
will do. 
6 Indeed, it is doubtful that Quine's condition of proxyhood (see [31] and [32]) or any 
other formal conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a legitimate reduction. 
v The need for a distinction among forms of being is briefly defended in §El of [14]. 
8 The general topic of ontological genesis is discussed more thoroughly in a book under 
preparation, Objects Under a Description. I can only be brief here. 
9 The concretizer C should be distinguished both from the operation of glossing, in 
Objects Under a Description, that takes an individual x and property P into the new 
individual x qua P, and from the much mooted operation of exemplication, that takes x 
and P into the state of x's being P. But these are differences that will not concern us in 
the paper. 
10 There is the question as to whether the distinction between determinate and 
non-determinate facts can sensibly be made out. I think it can; but I shall not discuss 
the issue here. 
~IAgain, the distinction between the two relations may be traced back to Moore ([24], p. 
145) in his contrast between direct and indirect verification. The distinction between 
determinate and non-determinate facts and its consequences for verification are also 
very clearly presented in Clark [7]. 
12 Shorter [37] has also suggested that there is an indeterminacy in our ordinary usage, 
but it is drawn between facts of the world and true propositions, not between facts and 
truths. He also discusses the bearing of such a distinction on the questions of negative 
facts and reducibility; but his conclusions are slightly different from my own. 
13 See [16] for further discussion of these distinctions. 
~4 I have assumed that there are necessary facts. Without this assumption, contingency 
may be defined as 3[([  = q (b v [ = q - 40 and then the other modal notions defined in 
terms of contingency. 
t~ In [13], I was led through different considerations altogether to distinguish between 
propositional and constitutive content. 
16 A similar point has been made in regard to semantical theories of truth. My point 
here is that the mere reference to facts does not help us to get a realist position. 
~7 The relevance of questions of identity to modal reduction was discussed, all too 
briefly, in §6 of [10]. 
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